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THE THREE FACES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT
APPEALS OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES
Peter Westen*
"O'Reilly was on trialfor grand larceny. The jury returned and
the foreman announced, Wot guilty.'
" 'Wondeiful,' O'Reilly exclaimed 'Does that mean I can keep
the money?' "t

Every now and then a case ·comes along that tests the fundamental premises of a body oflaw. United States v. DiFrancesco 1 presents
such a test to the law of double jeopardy, raising the question
whether the government may unilaterally appeal a defendant's criminal sentence for the purpose of increasing the sentence.2 The question cannot be answered by facile reference to the text of the fifth
amendment, because the terms of the double jeopardy clause are not
self-defining. Nor can it be settled by reference to history, because
the issue has not arisen with any frequency until now. 3
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard University; J.D. 1968,
University of California, Berkeley. - Ed.
t What's So Funny?, PSYCH. TODAY, June, 1978, at 104.
l. 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
2. See note 157 infra.
3. Although several states allow the prosecution to cross-appeal a defendant's sentence for
the purpose of seeking an increase on appeal in response to a defendant's prior appeal of
sentence, no state permits the prosecution to initiate an appeal of sentence for the purpose of
seeking an increase on appeal. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF
SENTENCES § 3.4, at 55 (Approved Draft, 1968); Note, Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals
ofSentences, 63 VA. L. REV. 325, 325-26 n.4 (1977). Massachusetts and Maine have identical
statutes which appear to permit the prosecution to initiate an appeal of sentence for the purpose of seeking an increase, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980), Me.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2142 (1980), but the Massachusetts statute has been construed to
mean that the prosecution may not appeal except in response to a defendant's prior appeal.
Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1211 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972). The
Maine statute is presumably to be construed in the same fashion, particularly in light of the
position taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that any other reading of the statute would be unconstitutional. See Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d at 1211. The
federal government authorizes the prosecution to initiate an appeal of sentence only with respect to the relatively infrequent prosecution of dangerous special offenders such as the defendant in United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
1012 (1980), and even there only since 1970. See 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (Supp. 1980), as noted in S.
REP. No. 96-553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1137 n.17 (1980), and 21 U.S.C. § 849(h) (1972) (a
statutory provision almost identical to § 3576). It is no accident that the unique provision for
government appeal of sentences in§ 3576 (and in its twin, 21 U.S.C. § 849(h)) is so recent. It is
only recently that Congress has authorized the government to take expanded appeals of any
kind in criminal cases. For a statutory history of the federal government's authority to take
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Moreover, although the issue has been lurking about for over a
century,4 it finds no authoritative resolution in the vast jurisprudence
of double jeopardy. The reason for this is that the Supreme Court's
decisions are ambivalent. On the one hand, the Court has said in
dictum that "to increase [a defendant's] penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."5 On the other hand, the
Court has held that a court may incr,ease a defendant's sentence in
consequence of an appeal if the defendant himself initiates the appeal. 6 To decide which line of cases is authoritative, one cannot rely
exclusively on either one; initially, one must put them both aside and
seek the answer in the fundamentals of double jeopardy. Thus, to
decide whether the Court's earlier dictum should now be invoked in
a case in which it would become a holding, one must decide whether
the dictum is a sound reflection of the values inherent in the double
jeopardy clause; similarly, to decide whether the Court's earlier
holding should now be followed in a case in which the defendant
himself is not taking an appeal, one must decide whether the presence or absence of an appeal by a defendant is significant in light of
the purposes of double jeopardy.
This search for controlling values is necessary in every constitutional area, but it is especially important, and difficult, in the area of
double jeopardy. For unlike other constitutional provisions, the
double jeopardy clause is a triptych of three separate values: (I) the
integrity of jury verdicts of not guilty, (2) the lawful administration
of prescribed sentences, and (3) the interest in repose. Each value is
entirely distinct from and theoretically independent of the others, all
appeals in criminal cases, see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-39 (1975) (describing
the history of title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, now in effect as 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (Supp. 1980); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307-08 (1970) (describing the statu•
tory history of the predecessor statutes to § 3731). As a result, the problem of governmentinitiated requests for increases in sentence could not arise before 1970 except in the context of
a government request to the trial court (as opposed to an appellate court) for a reconsideration
of sentence, e.g., Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), or a government petition to an
appellate court for writ of mandamus (as opposed to an appeal) for the correction of an illegal
sentence, e.g., United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) (dictum}, later taken as authority
for the proposition that a trial court has no constitutional authority under the double jeopardy
clause to increase a defendant's sentence at the government's request, United States v. Benz,
282 U.S. 304,307 (1931). For a fuller discussion of Lange, see text accompanying notes 165-69

infta.
5. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304,307 (1931). The foregoing statement from Benz was
dictum because the actual issue in Benz was not whether a trial court may increase a defendant's sentence at the government's request, but whether it may reduce a defendant's sentence at
his request.
6. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969).
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being related to one another only by the "rubric"7 of the double
jeopardy clause. 8 To solve the problem of government appeals of
criminal sentences - indeed, to solve any difficult problem of
double jeopardy - one must identify the three values and match
them to their respective weights, taking care not to use examples of
one as authority for another. 9 The foregoing approach not only
promises to bring coherence to the jurisprudence of double jeopardy,
but also works to transform complex cases into simple ones.
This tripartite approach to double jeopardy is particularly useful
for the .DiFrancesco problem of government appeals of criminal
sentences. As we shall see, two of the three values of double jeopardy tum out to be irrelevant to .DiFrancesco, while the weight of the
third value is such as to render the resolution of .DiFrancesco nearly
self-evident. In short, .DiFrancesco is a seemingly difficult case that
analysis reveals to be actually rather easy.
I.

THE THREE FACES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Some constitutional provisions, having unitary purposes, lend
themselves to textual analysis: one customarily begins with a phrase
(or even a single word) from the Constitution and attempts to state
its meaning in a manner consistent with its original purposes and
developed jurisprudence. 10 The double jeopardy clause is not such a
provision. The double jeopardy clause does not lend itself to easy
textual analysis, because its words and phrases change their meaning
depending upon which of its three purposes is-at issue. The three
purposes are simply too distinct from one another to be usefully
combined in any single formulation, and any effort to do so inevitably results in a statement too abstract and generalized to be capable
of resolving particular cases. 11 To avoid confusion it helps to put
7. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 46 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
8. See Illinois v. Vitale, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2264 (1980) ("[t]he constitutional prohibition of
double jeopardy has been held to consist of three separate guarantees"); United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (the double jeopardy clause serves several purposes -purposes that are
"separate" yet "related").
9. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 n.3 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (cases defining the "same" offense for purposes of successive prosecution should not be
invoked as authority for the definition of the "same offense" for purposes of cumulative punishment).
10. For example, the constitutional meaning of a defendant's sixth amendment right to be
"confronted" with the "witnesses against him" can be usefully investigated by inquiring int?
the meaning of the phrase, ''witnesses against him." See Westen, The Future ofCo,!frontation,
77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1187-90 (1979).
11. Perhaps the most striking example was Justice Black's statement that the essence of
double jeopardy is that no one should have to "run the gantlet" more than "once." Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957). The obvious difficulty with Justice Black's "colorful
and graphic phrase," Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 465 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting}, is
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aside the specific words of the fifth amendment and directly analyze
its three underlying meanings; once its various meanings have been
identified and separately formulated, one can then return to the original text and make the respective connections. 12
A.

Acquittals: The .Defendant's Interest in the Integrity of Jury
Verdicts of Not Guilty

We begin with the rule that is said to be "fundamental" 13 to the
double jeopardy clause: the constitutional right of a defendant not
to be further prosecuted following a jury verdict of not guilty. This
rule is assumed to be fundamental because it is the most "absolute." 14 It not only operates without exception, but also applies even
where the jury's verdict of not guilty is wholly implicit. 15 The question, therefore, is whether the "absolute finality" 16 of a jury verdict
that the terms, "gantlet," "run," and "once," are no more self-defining than the original phrasing of the fifth amendment. Accordingly, in order to decide what these new terms mean, one
must follow the same path one takes in deciding what the original fifth amendment phrasing
means - "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." That is, in order to decide what the words of the fifth amendment mean, one
must first ascertain what purposes they serve. When one does, one will discover, once again,
that the purposes are "separate,'' United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978), and, accordingly, that the meanings of the constituent terms change in accord with the several purposes for
which they are invoked. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("the meaning of this phrase ['the same offense'] may vary from context to
context"). To be sure, one can always take the step of subsuming all three meanings under a
general notion of procedural "fairness;" but if one does, one will discover that "fairness" states
the issue at too high a level of generality to be of any utility in resolving actual problems. To
resolve real problems, one will be forced once again to reduce "fairness" to its separate constituent elements.
12. Consider, for example, the fifth amendment term ''the same offense." With respect to
whether a defendant may be tried for an offense after having already been convicted of a prior
offense, the second offense is the "same" as the first if the second necessarily contains any
statutorily sufficient elements in common with the first. See Illinois v. Vitale, 48 U.S.L.W.
4741, 4742-43, 4744 (U.S. June 19, 1980) (per White, J.). With respect to whether a defendant
may be given multiple sentences for multiple offenses following a single trial for a given course
of conduct, one offense is not the "same" as another if the legislature explicitly intended that
they be cumulatively punished, even though one contains elements necessarily. found in another. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1440 (1980) (White, J., concurring). See
also 100 S. Ct. at 1436. With respect to whether a defendant may be tried for an offense after
having already been acquitted of a prior offense, the second offense is the "same" as the first if
the prosecution attempts to prove any issue of fact in the second proceeding which it tried and
failed to prove in the first, even though the legislature intended the two offenses to be cumulatively punishable, and even though the second offense contains no statutorily sufficient elements in common with the first. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See generally
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977). To try to formulate a single definition of
''.same offense" for these three separate purposes would produce a statement of such abstract
generality as to be of no usefulness in resolving actual cases.
13. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
14. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 16 (1978).
15. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957).
16. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).
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of not guilty has any bearing on the authority of the government
unilaterally to appeal for an increase in a defendant's sentence.
To answer the foregoing question one must first identify the constitutional value that underlies the jury-acquittal rule, and then determine the relevance of the value to government appeal of
sentences. Although the Supreme Court has yet to explain the juryacquittal rule, there appear to be three possible rationales: (1) the
defendant's expectation of finality regarding jury verdicts of not
guilty; (2) the jury's constitutional prerogative to find the facts; and
(3) the jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence.
1.

The Expectation of Finality

The finality argument takes two separate forms - one based on
the expectations a defendant actually has, and the other based on the
expectations he is entitled to have. The argument from actual expectations must fail, because its implications are implausible. If the
jury-acquittal rule were based on actual expectations, jury acquittals
would never be final unless defendants were shown actually to have
expected them to be final; yet jury acquittals are now treated as final
without reference to any such showing, and even without any reasonable likelihood of such a showing. 17 Moreover, if the jury-acquittal rule were based on actual expectations, the rule could be erased
merely by making a prospective change in people's actual expectations; yet surely it would be unconstitutional to enact a statute for the
appeal of jury acquittals, even if the statute were made wholly prospective and were applied only to defendants having notice of the
new statute. 18
·
17. Thus, the defendant in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), did not show and
could not have shown that he actually relied on the finality of the jury's decision implicitly to
acquit him of first degree murder, because at the time he was tried, the prevailing rule in the
federal courts was that an implicit acquittal is not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes
and does not operate to immunize a defendant from being retried on the charge of which he
was implicitly acquitted. SeeTrono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (distinguished if not
altogether overruled in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 194-98). The Trono rule was in
effect at the time in a majority of the states that had considered it. See Green v. United States,
355 U.S. at 216-18 n.4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
18. This was essentially the situation in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The
defendant in Benton was tried in a Maryland state court on two counts. After being explicitly
acquitted on one and convicted on the other, he successfully challenged his conviction on the
ground that the entire underlying indictment was invalid. Following the reversal of his conviction, he was retried and convicted on both counts, a disposition which was entirely in accord
with the longstanding law of Maryland at the time of his original trial. The defendant in
Benton could not have actually relied on the finality of his explicit acquittal, because at the
time he moved to set aside his original conviction, he knew that the law of Maryland then in
effect permitted the state to retry him on the count of which he had been acquitted following
his successful challenge to the underlying indictment. See Benton v. State, l Md. App. 647,
650-51, 232 A.2d 541, 542-43 (1967) (collecting authorities). Nor could the defendant have
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The stronger argument is that a defendant is entitled to an expectation of finality, regardless of whether he actually has such an expectation. This argument takes several forms. A favorite form is
that if the state is allowed to reprosecute following jury acquittals, it
will inevitably convict innocent defendants, because it will deliberately wear them down through repeated litigation, or intentionally
persist in prosecuting them until it eventually finds a jury willing to
convict. 19 A variation of the argument is that if the state is allowed
to reprosecute in such cases, it will obtain an unfair advantage over
the defendant, because it will intentionally use the first trial as a discovery device for inspecting the defendant's case, or as a dry run for
testing its own case. 20
The trouble with these arguments is not that they are bad, but
that they are unresponsive: they do not explain the "absolute" nature of the jury-acquittal rule. If the rule were designed solely to
protect innocent defendants, or solely to prevent the prosecution
from using the first trial as a dry run or from shopping for a conviction-prone jury, the rule would be confined to abuses of that kind. It
would be tailored to correspond to the separate double jeopardy
standards that now govern reprosecution following mistrials and reversed convictions - namely, that once jeopardy attaches, the state
may not retry a defendant over his objection solely for the deliberate
purpose of improving upon its case, harassing the· defendant, or
shopping for a more favorable trier of fact. 21 Instead, the jury-acquittal rule sweeps far more broadly than the rules for mistrials and
reversed convictions - and far more broadly than reasonable to
serve the foregoing purposes22 - because it accords absolute finality
to jury acquittals even where the prosecution is acknowledged to
relied on the federal constitutional rule of double jeopardy to the contrary, because it was well
understood at the time of his original trial that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment did not apply to the states. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled in
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
19. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (''The underlying idea •.. is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated at•
tempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby • . . enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."). See also Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S.
464, 474 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
20. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970),
21. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 485 & n.12 (1971) (plurality opinion).
22. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810-13 & n.18 (1969) (Harlan, J,, dissenting)
(the federal constitutional rule, that a defendant may never be retried following an acquillal by
a jury, goes further than is necessary to prevent the state from reprosecuting a defendant in
bad faith or for no legitimate reason). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,328 (1937),
overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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have acted in good faith and even where the acquittals are known to
be "egregiously erroneous."23
The next argument builds upon the former. The real problem, so
the argument goes, is not that the state will retry a defendant intentionally to manipulate or harass, but that retrial will inevitably have
those ejfects. 24 Thus, even if an error in the original trial is acknowledged not to be the fault of the prosecution, and even if the prosecution thus has a legitimate, good-faith reason for wishing to retry the
defendant, retrial has the inevitable effect of both enabling the prosecution to improve upon its case and burdening the defendant with
the onus and anxiety of further proceedings.
Notice that this argument avoids the problem surrounding the
first justification. The first justification was based on a set of values
which, though sound and well-accepted, were simply too narrow to
support the sweeping scope of the jury-acquittal rule. The second
argument avoids that problem by invoking a rationale that is sufficiently broad to support a rule of "absolute finality." The problem
with the second argument, however, is that the value it invokes i.e., the absolute value in protecting defendants from the unintended
burdens and tactical disadvantages of retrial - has been rejected by
the Supreme Court in every other area of double jeopardy in which
it has arisen. Thus, the Court has held that unless the state is shown
to be retrying a defendant solely for the purpose of improving upon
its case, shopping for a more favorable trier of fact, or harassing the
defendant, the state may retry a defendant following pretrial factfinding terminating in his favor, 25 following mistrials declared over
his objection, 26 mistrials declared because ofhungjuries,27 and convictions reversed on appeal; 28 and the state may do so even though
the state itself is partly at fault for the wrongful way in which the
initial proceeding terminated. 29
23. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam).
24. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) ("The underlying idea ... is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . .").
25. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
29. In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) and United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662
(1896), the prosecution was responsible for the defect in the defendant's initial trial. In United
States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976), and Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), the
trial judge was responsible for the. erroneous termination of the preliminary proceedings.
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Perhaps the best example is the rule of United States v. Ba!P 0 that
a defendant, who is wrongfully convicted at his original trial because
of prejudicial error on the part of the state, may nonetheless be retried by the state following the setting aside of his conviction on appeal. Ball is directly on point, because as far as the burdens and
tactical disadvantages of retrial are concerned, a defendant who is
retried following an erroneous conviction is in precisely the same
position as a defendant who is retried following an erroneous acquittal. Each defendant has already gone through one full trial; each of
the original trials was infected with prejudicial error; each of the defendants, if now retried, faces both the burdens of renewed litigation
and the tactical disadvantage of having disclosed his case to the prosecution. In short, whatever other differences may exist between retrial following an erroneous acquittal and retrial following an
erroneous conviction, no differences exist regarding either litigation
burdens on the defendant or strategic benefits to the prosecution.
The final argument for a defendant's expectation of finality focuses on the remaining difference between an erroneous acquittal
and an erroneous conviction. The significant difference (so the argument goes) is that while a conviction terminates a case to a defendant's disadvantage, an acquittal terminates the case in his favor.
Accordingly, the reason the double jeopardy clause affords greater
.finality to an erroneous acquittal than to an erroneous conviction is
to safeguard the particular feelings of relief and desire for repose
that only an acquitted defendant enjoys.
The foregoing argument contains several flaws. For one thing, it
begs the question at issue by comparing the acquitted defendant to
the convicted defendant at the wrong point in time. The relevant
comparison is to the convicted defendant not at the time of conviction, but at the time his conviction is set aside on appeal.3 1 At the
point when a conviction is set aside, a defendant who has prevailed
on appeal experiences precisely the same feelings of relief and
desires for repose as a defendant who has just been acquitted by a
jury. If a convicted defendant's feelings and desires do not suffice to
outweigh the state's interest in reprosecution following a successful
appeal, it is hard to see why an acquitted defendant's feelings would
suffice.32 Furthermore, the argument fails to explain why a defen30. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
31. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 136 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[w]e
must consider [the convicted defendant's] position at the moment when his exceptions are
sustained (on ~appeal]. The first verdict has been set aside. The jeopardy created by that is at
an end, and the question is what shall be done with the prisoner").
32. Again, it begs the question to say that a convicted defendant, who chooses to continue
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dant's feelings of relief and desire for repose do not suffice to accord
absolute finality to the other kinds of erroneous rulings that terminate a case in his favor, such as dismissals before trial, dismissals at
mid-trial, post-verdict judgments of acquittal, and appellate judgments of acquittal. If the defendant's feelings and desires were controlling, the latter rulings should confer the same kind of immunity
from reprosecution that erroneous acquittals do. Yet they do not. 33
Accordingly, regardless of how much weight one attaches to a
defendant's feelings of joy over a favorable outcome, there is no
principled basis for according greater finality to an erroneous acquittal than to a reversed conviction. 34 Indeed, if anything, the erroneously convicted defendant is the more deserving of the two
defendants because he was the unwilling victim of an error at trial
and, but for the error, might have been acquitted; the erroneously
acquitted defendant was probably the perpetrator of the error and,
but for its commission, might well have been convicted.35
To conclude, none of the previous arguments regarding expectathe proceedings by pursuing an appeal, waives or relinquishes his desire for repose; it can be
equally (and more accurately) said that he relinquishes a desire for repose only insofar as
necessary to obtain the relief to which he is entitled, ie., an appellate court order setting aside
his conviction for error. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (it cannot be said that a convicted defendant, who successfully appeals his conviction, thereby ''waive[s]'' his interest in not being retried, because ''no such waiver is expressed
or thought of'). For a discussion of the factors that underlie the fiction of waiver, see text
accompanying notes 190-205 iefra.
33. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (defendant may be retried following an erroneous termination of a case in his favor before trial); Lee v. United States, 432
U.S. 23 (1977) (defendant may be retried following dismissal, on defendant's motion, of defective information at mid-trial); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1978) (government may appeal a trial judge's judgmt11t of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, if the result
of the appeal is to reinstate the trial judge's prior finding of guilty); Forman v. United States,
361 U.S. 416,426 (1960) (government may appeal or seek certiorari from an appellate court's
erroneous judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, if the result of the appeal is to
reinstate a prior valid verdict of guilty).
34. See notes 148, 221 iefra. The same is also true of erroneous rulings by judges in a
defendant's favor in the course of jury trials. Thus, it has been suggested that when a trial
judge makes a post-verdict ruling in a defendant's favor - however erroneous the ruling may
be - the defendant's interest in feelings of relief and desires for repose become sufficiently
strong to preclude the government from appealing the ruling. The Court has rejected this
argument, holding that a defendant's interest in such repose is not legitimate if it sacrifices the
state's interest in an error-free trial. See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975):
To be sure, the defendant would prefer that the Government not be permitted to appeal
[an erroneous ruling in his favor] or that the judgment of conviction not be entered, but
this interest of the defendant is not one that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to
protect.
See also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 216 (1978).
35. The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It asks no more than this, that the case against him shall go on until
there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error. This is not cruelty
at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree. If the trial had been infected with
error adverse to the accused, there might have been review at his instance, and as often as
necessary to purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege . • . has now been granted to
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tions of finality are capable of explaining why the jury-acquittal rule
is so much more "absolute" than its companion principles of double
jeopardy. This does not mean that expectations of finality are vacuous, or that a defendant's desire for repose remains entirely unprotected. Finality is an important value and, as we shall see, it plays a
crucial role in limiting the constitutional authority of the state to
continue to prosecute defendants following mistrials, dismissals, and
reversed convictions. The fact remains, however, that the finality
value, though substantial, is not so powerful as to confer immunity
on a defendant whenever an error causes a trial to terminate in his
favor. There is an obvious reason for the reluctance to treat finality
as an absolute value: claims for finality - like claims regarding
preindictment delay, speedy trial, and statutes of limitation - are
highly threatening to the legal order because they operate to confer
blanket immunity on defendants without regard to their factual guilt
or innocence. The greater weight that is accorded the finality value,
the greater the frequency that factually guilty defendants will go
free. It is not surprising, therefore, that the finality value itself is not
absolute, and that it is always carefully balanced against "society['s]
. valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished."36
2.

The Jury's Prerogative To Find Facts

The next justification for the jury-acquittal rule avoids the inherent problems of finality. Claims of finality are problematical because they do not distinguish between factually innocent and
factually guilty defendants. The instant argument, in contrast, purports to make that distinction, thus avoiding the problem of invoking
blanket immunity on behalf of guilty and innocent defendants alike.
The reason jury acquittals are final, so the argument goes, is that
they represent factual findings of innocence by a body that has unreviewable authority to find facts. The same reason explains why acquittals are different from convictions. Jury acquittals are final (and
jury convictions are not) because jury acquittals are statements of
actual innocence. If the state is allowed to retry defendants followthe state. There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry,
to many, greater than before.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (citations omitted}, overruled in Benton v. Ma•
ryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (a defendant is "no more .•. put in jeopardy a second time when
retried because of a mistake ... in his favor, than he [is] •.. when retried for a mistake that
did him harm").
36. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 15 (1978).
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ing jury acquittals, it creates an unacceptable risk that innocent defendants will be convicted.
The foregoing argument would be perfectly sound if the juryacquittal rule were confined to error-free acquittals. An error-free
acquittal is probative evidence of factual innocence; indeed, it is
often the best such evidence known to the law. If the state were to
retry defendants in the face of such evidence, it would be running a
high risk of convicting factually innocent persons.37
Unfortunately, while the innocence argument explains why error-free acquittals should be final, it does not explain the finality of
erroneous acquittals, much less "egregiously erroneous"38 acquittals.
An erroneous acquittal, by definition, is a verdict which is tainted to
a material degree by some defect in the fact-finding process - perhaps because the probative incriminating evidence was wrongfully
excluded, or because unprobative exculpatory evidence was wrongfully admitted, or because the jury was wrongfully impaneled or instructed. As the product of faulty fact-finding, an erroneous jury
, acquittal says nothing about a defendant's actual innocence because
it says nothing about what an error-free process would have revealed.39 Indeed, an erroneous conviction may be more probative of
innocence than an erroneous acquittal: a defendant whose conviction is set aside on appeal because of prejudicial error is always
someone who, but for the error, could reasonably have been acquitted, and he is sometimes someone who now has to be acquitted; a
person whose acquittal is based on an error harmful to the prosecution is always someone who, but for the error, could reasonably have
been convicted, and he is sometimes someone who would now rea37. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 809-13 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. See note 23 supra.
39. The best analogy is to the ieventh amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases. The
seventh amendment specifically provides that "no fact tried by a [civil) jury shall be otherwise
examined in any court of the United States." U.S. CONST., amend. VII. Yet it is well established that a finding of fact by a civil jury may be appealed without violating the seventh
amendment when a party can show that the jury's findings were based on legal errors in the
fact-finding process. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. I, 13 (1899). The reason for
this is that findings of fact possess no integrity if based on defects in the fact-finding process.
q. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 106 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (verdicts of acquittal that are based on legal errors in the fact-finding process do not establish anything regarding
the defendant's actual innocence).
The same is true of erroneous rulings by a judge in a defendant's favor in the course of a
jury trial. An erroneous application by a judge of the law to the facts says nothing about a
defendant's actual innocence because it says nothing about what would have resulted from a
correct application of the law to the facts. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 106-07
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975)
("A system permitting review of all claimed legal errors would have sy=etry to reco=end
it and would avoid the release of some defendants who have benefited from instructions or
evidentiary rulings that are unduly favorable to them").
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sonably have to be convicted.40
3.

The Jury's Prerogative To Acquit Against the Evidence

The last justification for the absolute finality of jury acquittals,
and the most coherent, is that the rule is a consequence of the jury's
prerogative to acquit against the evidence. This justification differs
from the previous one. It is based not on the jury's authority to find
facts, but on its authority to nullify the law in individual criminal
cases. When a jury acquits against the evidence, it is not making a
factual determination regarding the disputed items of evidence; if
that were so - that is, if the jury were simply resolving disputed
issues of fact in the defendant's favor under prevailing standards of
proof- it would be acquitting on the evidence, not against the evidence. Nor can the jury be said to be faithfully applying the legal
standard of conduct prescribed by the legislature; if the jury were
doing so - if the evidence justified an acquittal under a faithful application of the legislative standard of criminal conduct - the acquittal, again, would be based on the evidence, not against it. To say
that a jury acquits against the evidence means that it acts against
what the law prescribes as the legal consequence of the facts as the
jury knows them to be. By being lenient toward a defendant where
the law does not prescribe lenience, the jury is exercising a species of
legislative power. More precisely, it is exercising a veto power: the
power to veto legislation in particular cases by fashioning a standard
for adjudging the past conduct of particular defendants that is distinct from and more lenient than the standard prescribed by the legislature.41
The authority of the crinµn.al jury to veto or nullify the rigor of
40. A "prejudicial" error is a "material" error, an error which can reasonably be said to
have had a potential effect on the outcome of trial. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, 14
MICH. L. REV. 191, 214-20 (1975). Accordingly, a defendant whose conviction is set aside on
appeal because of prejudicial error is necessarily someone who, but for the error, could reasonably have been acquitted. Moreover, a sub-class of such cases is made up of those in which the
prejudicial error consisted of admitting evidence which is crucial to the prosecution's case
against the defendant. In those latter cases, an appellate reversal for prejudicial error means
that the defendant is not only someone who could reasonably have been acquitted at this
initial trial, but someone who, if retried now, will have to be acquitted at the close of the state's
case.
By the same token, a defendant who is wrongfully acquitted at trial because of an error
prejudicial to the prosecution is necessarily someone who, but for the error, might reasonably
have been convicted. Moreover, if the error was truly crucial, the defendant may be left with
such a weak case that if trial courts were permitted to direct verdicts against defendants in
criminal cases, a court would have to so direct the jury.
41. See Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (1980) (when juries acquit against the
evidence, they are "creat[ing] their own sentencing discretion" in place of the standards prescribed by the legislature).
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the criminal law distinguishes the sixth-amendment criminal jury
from the seventh-amendment civil jury. Although both have inviolate constitutional authority to find facts, the civil jury can be confined to the province of fact-finding. The most common jury-control
devices (such as directed verdicts, 42 judgments notwithstanding theverdict,43 special verdicts, 44 partial directed verdicts, 45 interrogate42. Directed verdicts are commonly employed in civil trials, both against plaintiffs and
against defendants. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 50. Directed verdicts are also commonly employed against the prosecution in criminal cases. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. Yet it is assumed
to be unconstitutional to direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal case. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564, 572-73 (1977); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S.
395, 408 (1947); Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895).
The prohibition of directed verdicts against defendants in criminal cases cannot be based
on a desire to allow the jury to find facts, because directed verdicts are only employed where
facts are not in dispute and where any verdict to the contrary would represent nullification of
the law. See Currie, Thoughts on .Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 72 (1977). Consequently, if directed verdicts are constitutionally prohibited in criminal
cases, it must be because the criminal jury cannot be constitutionally prevented from nullifying
the law.
Now it might be argued that the reason directed verdicts of guilty are prohibited in criminal cases is that they would inevitably intrude to some extent, however minor, on the jury's
authority to find facts. When a trial judge directs a verdict, so the argument goes, he invariably makes some assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative nature of the
evidence. Such assessments may be tolerable in civil cases, where the issues are less sensitive,
but the sixth amendment reflects the judgment that judges are not to be trusted to make such
assessments adversely to defendants in criminal cases. In other words, so the argument goes,
judges are not to be trusted to say that evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that "reasonable"
jurors would have to convict.
There are at least two problems with the foregoing argument. First, it disregards authority
to the effect that when a trial judge directs a verdict in a criminal case, he is not making factual
determinations. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Second, even if it is true
that directed verdicts involve some assessment of facts, the same is not true of special verdicts.
Special verdicts do not intrude in any way upon a jury's authority to find facts; the only function special verdicts perform is to prevent the jury, once it has found the facts, from reaching a
conclusion which is contrary to the legally mandated consequence of such facts. Yet special
verdicts, too, are prohibited in criminal cases. See note 44 i'!fra. If special verdicts are prohibited in criminal cases, it cannot be because they interfere with the jury's authority to find facts;
it must be because they interfere with the jury's authority to render a general verdict of not
guilty in the face of what its special findings of fact dictate. This supports the view that the
same latter value also underlies the prohibition on directed verdicts in criminal cases.
43. Judgments notwithstanding the verdict are common in civil cases, against both plaintiffs and defendants. See FED. R. Crv. P. 50. Judgments notwithstanding verdicts are also
employed in criminal cases against the prosecution. See FED. R CRIM. P. 29(c). Yet such
judgments, which have been called "hang-fire cousins" of directed verdicts, Cooper, .Directions
far .Directed Verdicts: A Compass far Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 903 (1971), are
constitutionally prohibited from being entered against an accused in a criminal case for the
same reason that directed verdicts are prohibited. See Standefer v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
1999, 2007 (1980); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979).
44. Special verdicts are used in civil jury trials, both against plaintiffs and against defendants. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a). Nor is there presumably any constitutional bar to their
use in criminal cases at a defendant's request. Yet it is commonly assumed to be unconstitutional to require a criminal jury, over a defendant's objection, to return special verdicts in
place of a general verdict. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 80-81, 83, 87, 9495 (1895); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), ajfd sub nom. United
States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); G. CLEMENTSON,
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ries to accompany general verdicts, 46 the ordering of new trials for
inconsistent verdicts, 47 judicial comment on the evidence,48 issue
SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 49 (1905); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 512, at 365 (1969).
The constitutional prohibition on special verdicts in criminal cases cannot be based on a
desire to give the jury full rein to find facts, because special verdicts operate to give the jury
just as much authority to find facts, and to apply the law to the facts, as juries enjoy under a
general verdict procedure. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE•
DURE§ 2509, at 510 (1971). Indeed, as far as the jury is concerned, it has just as much authority under special verdicts as under a general verdict, with one exception: not knowing the legal
consequence of its constituent findings of fact, the jury cannot manipulate its particular findings to reach a result it otherwise desires, nor can it reach an outcome that departs from the
automatic legal consequence of the particular findings it returns. That is to say, it cannot
nullify the law by returning a general verdict which is inconsistent with the automatic and selfevident legal effect of its special findings. See Id. at 511-12. Thus, the sole purpose of special
verdicts is to deny the jury the opportunity for nullifying the law that the jury would possess
under a general-verdict procedure. See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE
L.J. 253, 258 (1920). Since the criminal jury is constitutionally entitled to return a general
verdict in place of special verdicts, it must be because the criminal jury has a constitutional
prerogative to nullify the law by returning general verdicts of not guilty in cases in which the
jury's constituent findings of fact would dictate verdicts of guilty.
45. Trial judges have authority to remove from a civil jury's consideration those portions
of a case about which there is no genuine dispute. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 56(d). Trial
judges presumably have constitutional power to enter such partial judgments in criminal cases,
too, at a defendant's request. Yet it is assumed to be unconstitutional to direct a partial verdict
against a defendant in a criminal case. See United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir.
1969); United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1965). See a/so 2 C. WRIGHT, FED·
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 461, at 243 n.8 (1969).
The prohibition on partial directed verdicts in criminal cases cannot be based on a desire to
allow the criminal jury to find facts, because such partial judgments are not entered when facts
are genuinely in dispute. See note 42 supra. Nor can it be based on the ground that partial
directed verdicts would altogether prevent juries from acquitting against the evidence, because
juries would still retain the authority to return a general verdict. Rather, it must be based on
the assumption that by removing crucial portions of a case from a jury's consideration, the trial
judge precludes the jury from seeing the ''whole picture" of a defendant's conduct and thereby
denies the jury an informational basis for exercising its veto power. See also note 49 i'!fra.
46. Trial judges have authority to request a civil jury to supplement its general verdicts
with answers to specific interrogatories, the purpose being to prevent the jury from returning a
general verdict that is inconsistent with its specific findings. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 49(b).
Yet it would be unconstitutional to require a crimin?,l jury to answer such interrogatories over
a defendant's objection, for the same reason that it is unconstitutional to require a criminal
jury to return special verdicts: each procedure is designed to prevent a jury from nullifying the
law by returning a general verdict that is inconsistent with its specific findings. Indeed, interrogatories are so disfavored that they may be unconstitutional even if they are used solely for
informational value, and not as a basis for attacking a general verdict. See Heald v. Mullaney,
505 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (1st Cir. 1974) (use of interrogatories in some criminal proceedings is
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Spock v. United States, 416 F.2d 165, 18083 (1st Cir. 1969) (hut see Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d at 1245, suggesting case was decided on
basis of court's supervisory powers).
The prohibition on interrogatories accompanying a general verdict cannot be based on a
desire to allow the criminal jury to find facts, because the interrogatory procedure is designed
to clar!fj,its findings of fact. Rather, it must be based on the assumption that the criminaljury
cannot constitutionally be confined to making findings of fact and, instead, must be allowed to
return general verdicts of not guilty that are inconsistent with its findings of fact.
47. Trial judges have authority to order new trials in civil cases whenever a civil jury returns inconsistent verdicts. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 59; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED·
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810, at 69 (1973). A federal judge may also order a new
trial in a criminal case when a jury returns two inconsistent verdicts of guilty. See, e.g., United
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preclusion based on previous fact-finding, 49 and appeals and new
trial orders based on legal errors affecting verdicts50) are all regularly
used in civil jury trials. These devices may be constitutionally employed in civil cases because they do not intrude upon any function
the civil jury is constitutionally entitled to perform. Since these devices are all designed to prevent the jury from misapplying the law,
and since the civil jury has no authority to decide the law differently
from the legislature, these jury-control devices have no effect on the
constitutional right of jury trial in civil cases. 51
States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.D.C.), a.ffd., 248 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958). Yet a federal judge may not order a new trial when a criminal
jury returns a ve:dict of not guilty that is inconsistent with an accompanying verdict of guilty.
See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
The prohibition on new trials for inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases cannot be based on
a desire to allow the jury to find facts, because the inconsistency demonstrates the failure of
coherent fact-finding. Rather, it must be based on the assumption that a criminal jury has
authority to acquit a defendant of one charge even if the acquittal is factually inconsistent with
the jury's determination that he is factually guilty of another. See note 61 i'!fra.
48. Federal judges have authority to co=ent on the evidence in civil cases. See 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2557 (1971). Yet regardless of
how overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be in a criminal case, it is unconstitutional for a
trial judge to comment to that effect, for the same reason that it is unconstitutional for a trial
judge to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal case. See United States v. England, 347 F.2d
425, 433-35 (7th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); Homing
v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
49. Principles of collateral estoppel can be invoked in a civil case by plaintiffs and defendants alike to preclude a party from relitigating any issue that has already been adjudicated
adversely to the party in a ptjor litigation. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971). Collateral estoppel may also be invoked by a defendant against the prosecution in a
criminal case. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Yet it is assumed to be unconstitutional to estop a defendant in a criminal case from relitigating an issue that he has tried
and failed to litigate successfully in a prior criminal proceeding. See Simpson v. Florida, 403
U.S. 384, 386 (1971); United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943); United
States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a.ffd., 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1978); State v.
Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). But see United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d
l, 6 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
The prohibition on collateral estoppel against an accused in a criminal case cannot be
based on a desire to allow juries to find facts, because the prohibition applies even where a
prior jury has already found facts adverse to the accused. Nor can it be based on a desire to
accord a defendant a right to be heard by a jury or to confront witnesses, or to enjoy his other
procedural guarantees at trial, because, again, the doctrine applies even where a defendant
enjoyed those guarantees at the prior proceeding. Rather, it must be based on the notion that
by removing certain issues from a jury's consideration, collateral estoppel blinds the jury to the
"whole picture" of a defendant's conduct and thus denies the jury an informational basis on
which to exercise its veto power. See the discussion of partial directed verdicts at note 45
supra.
50. Appeals may be taken in civil cases, and new trials sought, by plaintiffs and defendants
alike whenever they can show that a civil jury verdict is infected by legal error. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. 59-60. Moreover, defendants in criminal cases can appeal from erroneous jury verdicts of conviction. Yet it is unconstitutional for the prosecution
to appeal from, or seek a new trial following, a jury verdict of acquittal in a criminal case. See
Standefer v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 (1980).
51. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Cooper, supra note 43, at 912,915.
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By the same token, however, such jury-control devices cannot be
constitutionally used by the prosecution in criminal cases, 52 because
insofar as the criminal jury may dispense mercy to defendants by
vetoing or nullifying the law, the criminal jury does possess authority
to decide the law. The use (and nonuse) of directed verdicts illustrates this distinction. Directed verdicts are commonly used against
plaintiffs and defendants alike in civil cases, and against the prosecution in criminal cases, but they are never used against defendants in
criminal cases. Indeed, it is universally assumed to be unconstitutional to direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal case. 53
Why this excepti~n? Why prohibit the prosecution from using a
device designed to confine the criminal jury to the province of factfinding? It cannot be based on a desire to let the jury find the facts,
because directed verdicts are used only where facts are not in dispute.54 Nor can it be based upon the stringent burden of proof applicable in criminal cases (and upon the consequent difficulty of
saying that the state's evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that reasonable men would have to convict), because that is precisely the
assessment that trial judges now make in finding criminal defendants
guilty in trials to the bench, and that appellate courts now make in
declaring constitutional errors to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 55
Nor can the prohibition on directed verdicts be based on a belief
that while the criminal jury has no legitimate right to nullify the law,
it somehow has an unpreventable power to do so. 56 After all, the
52. See notes 42-50 supra.
53. See note 42 supra.
54. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 907-08, 912, 916-17, 918-21; Currie, supra note 42. In
addition, see note 42 supra.
55. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,.254 (1969).
56. For an expression of this view, see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 347 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting) (referring to the "raw power of nullification"); Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (Holmes, J.), quotingfrom Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d
Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.) (referring to jury nullification as the "assumption" by a jury of a
"power" which it has "no right to exercise"). But compare Standefer v. United States, 100 S.
Ct. 1999, 2007 (1980) (''The absence of these remedial ijury-control] procedures in criminal
cases permits juries to acquit out of compassion . . . .") (emphasis added); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (it would be "unconstitutional" to use
jury control devices to prevent juries from engaging in "discretionary act[s] of jury nullification").
The most fascinating question is, why did judges like Holmes and Hand, who must have
known better, nonetheless feel obliged to intone the message that juries possess only the
"power," and not the "right," to acquit against the evidence. Perhaps the answer is that such a
message was their own form of "pious perjury." q. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW 239 (1769) (jury nullification is the jury's form of "pious perjury"). That is, they may
have known, consciously or subconsciously, that the message is false and that juries do possess
the "right" to acquit against the evidence, and yet felt that they must continue to say otherwise,
for the same reason that juries are not instructed that they are entitled to acquit against the
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very purpose of the directed verdict (and other jury-control devices)
is to prevent juries from exercising the power to decide the law when
they have no right to do so. If the legal system wished to prevent the
criminal jury from nullifying the law, it would respond the way it
does in civil cases - by directing verdicts whenever the trial evidence contains no genuine issues of fact. To say that a judge may
not constitutionally direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal
case means that he may not constitutionally confine the criminal jury
to the role of fact-finding. 57 The same is true, too, of other jurycontrol devices. By eschewing the use of jury-control devices that
would cabin the criminal jury in a fact-finding role, the system
reveals that the jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence is
not only·a "power," but a power the jury exercises as of "right."58
The instant rule of double jeopardy, that the state may not take
evidence: because if juries begin to learn that they may acquit against the evidence as of
"right," their exercise of nullification will become self-conscious and will have a distorting
effect on competing and coexisting values inherent in trial by jury. q. United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, I 130-36 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (jurors, who possess the prerogative to
acquit against the evidence, should not be so instructed, because by rendering nullification
self-conscious, such instructions may have a distorting effect on other procedural values).
57. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979) (to say that "there can be no
appeal from a judgment of acquittal, even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming," means, as
a "logical corollary," that the jury is "permilletl' to acquit against the evidence) (emphasis
added).
58. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,317 n.10 (1979); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion); M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION To DISOBEY 57
(1973).
It does not follow that, because jurors have a constitutionally protected prerogative to acquit against the evidence, they must be told that they do, or that they must be subject to voir
dire in such a light, or that they must be allowed to hear evidence relevant to such a decision.
There are persuasive reasons why the latter procedures would not only be difficult to administer, but would also have an adverse impact on coexisting and competing values in trial by jury.
See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (it does not follow that, because
criminal jurors have a constitutional right to return a general verdict of not guilty, they also
have a right to be instructed on lesser-included offenses not supported by the evidence); United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (it does not follow that, because
criminal jurors have a constitutional prerogative to acquit against the evidence, they also have
a right to be instructed on the prerogative). Thus, it is perfectly rational to affirm the value of
jury nullification while simultaneously refraining from encumbering it with accompanying
procedural devices.
Nor does it follow that because juries have a constitutionally protected prerogative to acquit against the evidence, the exercise of that prerogative is always beyond challenge. On the
contrary, the Court has held in the death-penalty context that jury nullification, if unguided by
standards, may have the effect of rendering the pattern of death sentences so arbitrary as to
violate the eighth amendment. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976)
(plurality opinion). But compare 428 U.S. at 315 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 203 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Finally, it does not follow that because juries have a prerogative to acquit against the evidence, erroneous jury verdicts of not guilty must always be upheld. On the contrary, one could
rationally distinguish between errors (such as the exclusion of incriminating evidence) that
affect a jury's decision to nullify and errors that do not, and reverse for the former while
continuing to dismiss for the latter. See Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory ofDouble
Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 130 n.230.
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an appeal from an erroneous jury verdict of not guilty, is an aspect of
the broader principle of jury nullification: the jury-acquittal rule derives from the criminal jury's constitutional prerogative to acquit
against the evidence. To say that a verdict is erroneous means that it
is the end product of a trial that did not conform to the rules governing opening statements, evidence, jury instructions, closing statements, and so forth. The purpose of such rules is to insure that a
case is tried in accord with the legislative standard governing guilt or
innocence. Yet as long as the criminal jury has authority to acquit
against the evidence, viz., authority to alter legislative standards in
favor of more lenient standards of its own, trial errors of that kind
may be immaterial. One cannot tell whether an "erroneous" acquittal is the product of legal error, or whether it is the fruit of the jury's
desire to nullify the law by which the case was tried. Since the jury
verdict itself is opaque,59 and since the jury cannot be easily examined about its verdict without skewing its deliberations, 60 two alternatives remain: either to reject all "erroneous" jury verdicts,
knowing full well that some of them will be based on the jury's desire to nullify, or to accept all such verdicts, knowing that some of
them will be the product oflegal errors. As between the two alternatives, the jury-acquittal rule opts for the latter, reflecting the judgment that it is ultimately better to err in favor of nullification than
against it. 61
59. As part of its authority to acquit against the evidence, the criminal jury has the constitutional prerogative to return a general verdict, and it cannot constitutionally be compelled to
return special verdicts instead. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 81, 83, 87,
94-95 (1895). In addition, see note 44 supra.
60. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932) ("That the [inconsistent] verdict
may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible.
But verdicts cannot be upset by . . . inquiry into such matters"); United States v. D'Angelo,
598 F.2d 1002, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1979) (collecting authorities); United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (inquiry into the grounds for a jury verdict may skew its conclusions). See generally Note, Constitutional Propriety efState Judges' Inquiries into the Numerical
.Division ef .Deadlocked Jurie.r. Ellis v. Reed, 64 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1980).
61. The decision to tip the balance in favor of nullification is not unusual, because the
same decision underlies the rule that a defendant who has been convicted by a jury on one
count and acquitted on another cannot challenge his conviction on grounds of inconsistency
between the two verdicts. When a jury returns inconsistent verdicts, its behavior can be explained in one of two ways: either it has misunderstood its instructions and, therefore, erred;
or it has deliberately acted out of "compassion or compromise," Standefer v. United States,
100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 (1980), by acquitting the defendant of a count of which it could have
convicted him. Without examining the jury about its verdict, see note 60 supra, the trial court
has no way of knowing which of the two potentialities occurred. Accordingly, the court can
respond either by setting aside all inconsistent convictions for error, knowing all along that at
least some of them are the product ofjury compassion, or by upholding all inconsistent convictions in the interest of nullification, knowing that some of them may be the product of error on
the part of the jury. The majority rule is that an appellate court may not set aside inconsistent
jury verdicts of guilty that can plausibly be explained as the product of" 'lenity'" on the part
of the jury. See Note, 35 Mo. L. REV. 535, 541 (1976), quoting Dunn v. United States, 284
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Now having identified the value or rationale underlying the juryacquittal rule, we can return to our original question. What is the
relationship between the jury-acquittal rule of double jeopardy and
the government's authority to appeal criminal sentences? What does
the constitutional finality of jury acquittals say about the finality of
trial court determinations of sentence? The answer depends upon
whether the prerogative to nullify is possessed not only by juries, but
also by trial judges, and upon whether the scope of nullification extends not only to issues of guilt or innocence, but also to the length
of sentence. If the authority to nullify is not shared by judges as well
as by juries, or if it does not apply to sentencing, the jury-acquittal
rule has nothing to say about government appeals of criminal
sentences. If, on the other hand, nullification extends to judges as
well as juries, and if it encompasses sentencing as well as guilt or
innocence, the constitutional value underlying the jury-acquittal rule
would prohibit the government from seeking to increase a defendant's sentence on. appeal.
The foregoing issues cannot be resolved purely by means oflogic.
As a matter of logic, one can rationally imagine regimes in which the
authority to nullify is possessed by both juries and judges, or by
neither juries or judges, or by one but not the other; by the same
token, one can rationally conceive of systems in which the authority
to nullify encompasses both guilt and sentence, or neither, or one but
not the other. The real issue, therefore, is not what our constitutional system rationally could be, but what it actually is.
Based on the same sort of data that suggest that criminal juries
U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (Holmes, J.). The majority rule thus reflects a decision that if error must
occur, it is better to err in the interest of preserving jury nullification. See Bickel, Judge and
Jury- Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1950). See
also United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 (2d Cir.) ("It is true, as both Judge Hand
and Mr. Justice Holmes recognized, that allowing inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials runs
the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise. But the advantage ofleaving the jury free to exercise its historic power oflenity has been correctly thought to
outweigh that danger.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914 (1967).
To be sure, the existing rule might be different if, as a result of reversing a conviction for
inconsistency, the government were allowed to retry the defendant on the count on which he
was acquitted. In that event, a defendant would have to choose his theory of what motivated
the jury in returning inconsistent verdicts. Ifhe decided the jury was motivated by "lenity," he
would be barred from appealing his conviction. If he decided the jury was motivated by error,
he would be barred from complaining about being retried on the count on which he was acquitted. In either event, he would be precluded from doing what he may now do: appeal his
conviction on grounds of error, while defending his acquittal on grounds oflenity. Before such
a new rule could be adopted, however, the courts would have to decide whether the interest in
jury lenity is an interest possessed only by defendants; for if the government, too, has an interest in the occurrence of nullification, then it could complain about the reversal of an inconsistent verdict of guilty even if the defendant were willing to be retried on the count on which he
was acquitted.
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do possess sixth amendment authority to acquit against the evidence,
it is fair to conqlude that trial judges do not possess comparable fifth
and fourteenth amendment authority. Judges (unlike juries) may be
reversed for legal errors favorable to the defense, regardless of
whether the favorable rulings occur before or after the case has been
submitted to· the jury,62 and regardless of whether reversal of the
favorable ruling necessitates retrial of the general issue.63 Moreover,
and more significantly still, trial magistrates can be reversed for factfinding favorable to the defense, provided that the reversal is based
on the record as taken at trial and does not require the taking of new
evidence. Thus, the Court held in Swisher v. Brady64 that a state
62. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (before); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S.
23 (1977) (before); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (after); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (after).
To be sure, the Court has also held that a trial judge may not be reversed for certain kinds
of erroneous rulings favorable to a defendant, i.e., resolutions of factual elements relating to a
defendant's guilt or innocence, if reversal would require that a defendant be retried. See
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71-73 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Yet if trial judges truly possessed the prerogative to nullify, then
favorable rulings by trial judges on issues of guilt or innocence would be final and nonappealable, regardless of whether the rulings were entered before trial or afterwards, and regardless of
whether reversal would result in retrial. But they are not. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 91 n.7 (1978) (government may appeal an erroneous resolution ofa factual issue relating to
a defendant's guilt or innocence if appeal will result in reinstatement of an existing and valid
verdict of guilty); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (same); Forman v. United
States, 361 U.S. 416, 426 (1960) (same); United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (government may always appeal an erroneous ruling in a defendant's favor if the ruling is entered
before trial); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (same). Whatever the justification
for the finality of the rulings in Sanabria and Marlin Linen, therefore, the justification cannot
be that trial judges possess the prerogative to acquit against the evidence.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
64. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). To be sure, the Swisher Court held that the Maryland procedure
consisted not of"two trials," 438 U.S. at 217, but ofa "single proceeding,'' 438 U.S. at 215, for
double jeopardy purposes. But it should be obvious that to say the Maryland procedure is a
"single proceeding" for double jeopardy purposes is like saying it is a regime of "continuing
jeopardy": the statement is a conclusion, not an explanation. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
534 (1975) ("The phrase 'continuing jeopardy' describes ... a conclusion"), That is, to call
the Maryland procedure a "single proceeding" for double jeopardy purposes is simply to say
that the discrete procedural steps prescribed by Maryland law will be treated as a "continuing"
procedure for constitutional purposes. It does not explain why the discrete steps should be so
treated. If the Court's conclusion is sound, it is because for double jeopardy purposes there is
nothing wrong with a system of bench trials in which the findings made by the magistrate who
hears the evidence and compiles the record are not final until accepted by a higher tribunal.
The same is true of the Swisher Court's statements that the trial magistrate was a "master"
rather than a "judge," 438 U.S. at 216, and that he was authorized only to make "proposed
findings" rather than to enter final •~udgment[s]." 438 U.S. at 217 n.15. These statements,
again, are entirely conclusory. They describe the double jeopardy effects of the Maryland
procedure, but they do not explain its constitutional rationale.
The foregoing point can be illustrated by assuming that Maryland now provides that all
juries shall henceforth act as "master[s],'' and that they shall have the authority to return only
"proposed findings,'' rather than final •~udgment[s]." What would the Court say about such a
system? Would it accept for double jeopardy purposes Maryland's characterization of its procedure as a "single proceeding"? Presumably not. Presumably it would say that while the
procedure was a "single proceeding" for purposes of Maryland law, it was not a single proceeding for double jeopardy purposes, because the double jeopardy clause prohibits the states
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may provide for a system of bench trials in criminal cases in which a
trial magistrate not only lacks the authority to acquit against the evidence, but cannot make final rulings oflaw or fact - including findings of not guilty - until affirmed on appeal by a higher tribunal.
This stands in marked contrast to the criminal jury whose verdicts
are constitutionally immune from appeal both on law and fact.
Furthermore, even if the prerogative of nullification extended to
judges, it does not extend to sentencing. If it did, criminal sentences
(like jury verdicts of not guilty) would be absolutely final. Yet the
Court has repeatedly and consistently held that, where a defend ant
appeals his conviction, a trial judge's determination of sentence can
be expunged and the defendant sentenced de novo, something that
cannot happen to a jury finding of not guilty. 65 Indeed, the Court
appears to adhere to the view that where sentencing is explicitly left
to a jury, even jury sentences may be set aside and reexamined de
novo. 66
from treating jury verdicts of not guilty as nonfinal. The latter conclusion is significant because it underscores the double jeopardy differences between the kind of proceeding at issue in
Swisher and a typical jury trial. If it is true that there is a constitutional difference between the
finality of the Swisher magistrate's "proposed findings" and the finality of a jury's verdict of
not guilty (and the Swisher Court held there was), it is not because of any fifth amendment
notions of finality, but because of sixth amendment notions of trial by jury that the double
jeopardy clause incorporates by reference. See note 99 infra. That is, what distinguishes
Swisher from the jury case is not that the Swisher magistrate's findings were only tentative, but
that Maryland was constitutionally allowed to treat them as tentative. And the reason Maryland was allowed to treat the magistrate's findings as tentative is because he was a magistrate
rather than a jury. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 132-37. Indeed, to the extent that
favorable findings or rulings by a judge are final for double jeopardy purposes, this is so only
because the double jeopardy clause incorporates by reference standards of finality that are
otherwise provided by law. For the extent to which the due process clause and/or the domestic law may prevent an appellate court from disregarding a trial judge's assessment of raw
facts, see the discussion of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Swisher in note 99 infra,
and the discussion of Martin Linen in note 146 infra. For the extent to which a procedural
regime may choose to vest nullification authority in a trial judge without having been constitutionally compelled to do so, see the discussion of Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904),
in Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 132-37.
65. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969). It is true, of course,
that the defendant in Pearce appealed his conviction, but it does not follow that he was willing
to be resentenced de novo in the event his conviction was reversed on appeal. More importantly, when a defendant has been implicitly acquitted by a jury on a greater charge, he cannot
be retried on that charge, even if he does appeal his underlying conviction. See Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Thus, a comparison of Pearce to Green demonstrates that
a judge's determination of sentence in a defendant's favor does not enjoy the constitutional
measure of finality possessed by a jury verdict in a defendant's favor.
66. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23-24 (1973); Stroud v. United States, 251
U.S. 15 (1919). It is true, of course, that the defendants in Chaffin and Stroud took the initiative in appealing the original convictions that underlay their original jury sentences. Nonetheless, even if they can be said to have waived their interest in the finality of their original jury
sentences by appealing their underlying convictions, it is significant that they could not have
been found to have waived their interest in finality if the original juries' favorable decisions
had related to the elements of the alleged offenses, rather than to the length of their sentences.
See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957). Thus, even assuming arguendo that
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The upshot is that the constitutional rule of "absolute finality"
for jury acquittals is confined to jury verdicts of not guilty, and does
not extend either to findings of not guilty by the bench or to determinations of sentence. There is nothing arbitrary in this. There are
significant differences between juries and judges that would justify
- though not necessitate - giving juries alone the prerogative to
acquit against the evidence.67 Similarly, there are significant differences between determinations of guilt or innocence and determinations of sentences that would justify confining nullification to the
former. 68 To say that the jury-acquittal rule does not extend to
the doctrine of waiver has some vitality, the Court draws a significant distinction between a
favorable judgment by a jury regarding the elements of an offense (which cannot be waived)
and a favorable judgment by a jury regarding the length of a sentence (which can be waived),
The foregoing distinction between guilt or innocence, on the one hand, and length of sentence, on the other, is best illustrated by Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966). The defendant
in Cichos was tried on two counts: involuntary manslaughter, punishable by two to twentyone years imprisonment; and reckless homicide, punishable by one to five years imprisonment,
He was originally found guilty of reckless homicide and sentenced to one to five years. After
successfully appealing his conviction, he was retried again on both counts and again sentenced
to one to five years in prison. He appealed, arguing that he had been placed twice in jeopardy
for the same offense by being retried for the greater offense of involuntary manslaughter after
the original jury had implicitly acquitted him of involuntary manslaughter. That is, the defendant relied on the principle of "implicit acquittal" that the court had already accepted in
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and later reaffirmed in Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S.
323 (1970) (it is a violation of double jeopardy not only to convict a defendant of a charge of
which he has been implicitly acquitted, but also to retry him for that offense, even where retrial
results again in an implicit acquittal of that offense). The Court in Cichos found it unnecessary
to decide whether the double jeopardy clause applied to the states, because the Court held that
even if the clause applied, it was not violated in Cichos, because Cichos was significantly different from Green. In Green, the defendant was originally tried on two separate offenses, each
having distinct elements of its own and one being more serious than the other; in Cichos, on
the other had, the two offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide contained
identical elements, the difference between them being solely a difference in the length of sen•
tence. This distinction is significant, the Court held, because the doctrine of implicit acquittal
only applies to favorable determinations by a jury regarding the elements of an offense, and
not to favorable determinations by a jury regarding the length of sentence. In sum, the Court
distinguishes for double jeopardy purposes between favorable determinations regarding guilt
or innocence and favorable determinations regarding the length of sentence, and it makes the
distinction even in cases in which both determinations are made by juries.
For a discussion of the justification for treating determinations of sentence differently from
determintions of guilt or innocence, see note 68 i,!fra.
61. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1960), noted in Mayers &
Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 14 HARV. L. REV. I, 27-28,
42-43 (1960). See also Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV, ISO, 157-66
(1951).
68. The differences are threefold. First, decisions regarding guilt or innocence are ei•
ther/or decisions, while decisions regarding sentence are finely graded decisions on a spectrum. In deciding guilt or innocence, the trier of facts makes gross decisions to convict or
acquit, or to convict on a greater offense or convict on a significantly different lesser offense; in
fixing a precise sentence, in contrast, the trier of fact chooses from among an almost infinite
array of possibilities. Second, decisions regarding guilt or innocence are approximate, while
designations of sentence are fully informed. When a trier of fact decides between convicting or
acquitting, or between convicting on a higher or convicting on a lower offense, it does not
know the precise consequence to the defendant of the various alternatives; when a trier of fact
fixes a particular sentence from within a range of sentences, in contrast, it knows precisely
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judges or to sentences is simply to say that ours is a constitutional
regime that has reasonably opted for less nullification where it could
conceivably have opted for more.
In summary, the first of the three rules of double jeopardy (that a
defendant cannot be further prosecuted following an "acquittal")
imposes no limitation on the authority of the government to appeal a
criminal sentence. A trial judge who sentences a defendant does not
implicitly "acquit" him of all higher sentences, because given the
values that underlie double jeopardy, "acquittals" for double jeopardy purposes are confined to jury verdicts of not guilty. That does
not mean, however, that the double jeopardy clause necessarily condones government appeals of sentence. It means, rather, that if
double jeopardy prohibits such appeals, it does so not because of the
rule against prosecution following an acquittal, but because of separate rules that remain to be explored.
B.

.Double Punishment: A .Defendant's Interest in the Lawful
Administration of Prescribed Sentences

Another potential limitation on government appeals of sentence
is the prohibition of double, or "multiple,"69 punishment. This rule
of double jeopardy, that a defendant may not be punished "twice"
what the consequence to the defendant will be. Third, decisions regarding guilt or innocence
are guided by instructions regarding particular and limited elements constituting the underlying offenses, and by the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Decisions regarding sentence are more open-textured. When a trier of fact decides to convict or acquit, or to
convict of a greater or lesser offense, its decision is guided by its instructions regarding the
particular elements of the underlying offenses; when a trier of fact fixes a sentence, in contrast,
it may receive no guidance at all regarding either the standards for sentencing or the burdens
of proof to be employed.
The foregoing distinctions help explain why a legal system might wish to confine the prerogative of nullification to determinations of guilt or innocence. It is precisely because nullification regarding guilt or innocence is less finely tuned, less self-conscious, less informed and
less guided that a legal system may allow it to operate there, while not allowing nullification
with respect to the more finely tuned, more informed and more self-conscious process of sentencing. This does not mean that the legal system is opposed to nullification. It simply means
that the value of nullification must be balanced against other competing interests, and that if
nullification becomes too self-conscious and too explicit, it will have a distorting ~ffect on those
other interests. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (it
does not follow that because the criminal jury has a constitutional prerogative to acquit against
the evidence, it must also be explicitly instructed that it possesses such prerogatives); M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 58, at 64-65 (same).
The foregoing distinctions also suggest that the more closely a sentencing decision approximates a decision regarding guilt or innocence, the more persuasive the defendant's claim for
finality. See State ex rel Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 921-22 (Mo. 1980) (Bardgett,
C.J., dissenting) (the death penalty is authorized only if the jury finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists; failure of the jury to make that finding
should be treated as an implicit acquittal that immunizes the defendant from being retried and
resentenced to death).
69. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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for the "same" offense, was first invoked by the Court over a hundred years ago in the first of its great double jeopardy decisions. 70
Unfortunately, despite the rule's venerable antiquity, the Court has
never clearly identified the constitutional value, or rationale, that informs the rule. To determine whether the prohibition has any bearing on unilateral government appeal of sentences, therefore, one
must begin by identifying the purpose of the prohibition on double
punishment.
This much is clear: the double jeopardy clause prohibits the state
from punishing a person twice for conduct that, by law, can be punished only once. That is to say, the state may not "double up" on a
defendant's sentence by punishing him "again" after he has fully
served the proper sentence prescribed by law for an offense. The real
task is to identify the source and content of the law that defines the
proper sentence for proscribed conduct. One cannot know whether a
defendant is being punished twice without knowing whether he has
yet been fully punished once, and one cannot know whether a defendant has been punished once without identifying the law that
governs sentences for particular conduct.
Paradoxically, the two sources of law most commonly advanced
are both ultimately untenable. It is sometimes suggested, on the one
hand, that the double jeopardy clause contains an independent standard of its own for defining the existence of a criminal offense and
for establishing the maximum permissible sentence for such an offense. According to that view, a state violates the prohibition of
double punishment whenever it defines criminal offenses in such a
way as to "double up" on what the double jeopardy clause itself defines to be the maximum sentence for an underlying offense.71
The obvious problem with the foregoing view is that the Constitution contains few (if any) standards for defining the constituent
elements of criminal offenses, and even fewer standards for determining the maximum permissible length of criminal sentences. At
most, the Constitution prohibits the state from imposing serious
criminal penalties on defendants for conduct for which they are not
personally at fault, 72 and from imposing sentences which are "ex10. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
11. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 792-94 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that even if Congress intended multiple punishments, the imposition of such punishment violated the double jeopardy clause).
72. See Jeffries & Stephan, .Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1370-76 (1979) (collecting authorities).
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treme[ly]" disproportionate to the severity of a crime.73 Beyond
those very minimum prerequisites, the elements of a criminal offense
and "the length of the sentence" are "purely ... matter[s] oflegislative prerogative." 74 Thus, if the principle of double punishment is
based on a constitutional definition of criminal offenses and on a constitutional measure of excessive sentences, it is both superfluous and
innocuous: superfluous, because it adds nothing to the protection
already provided by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments; innocuous, because the limitations it prescribes
are too lax and too general ever realistically to come into play.
It is also said, on the other hand, that the double jeopardy clause
merely incorporates by ·reference whatever the domestic law - state
or federal - defines as an offense and as a lawful sentence for· an
offense; hence, a court violates the double jeopardy clause if it imposes a sentence in excess of what-the legislature intended as the full
penalty for a particular offense.75 Unfortunately, this formulation,
too, is flawed because it produces a principle of double punishment
that will always be either superfluous or irrelevant: if a court is applying statutes enacted by its 9wn respective legislature, double punishment becomes irrelevant because the court's constitutional
analysis will always be identical to, and entirely derivative from, its
statutory analysis of legislative intent; if a court is reviewing the statutes of a sister jurisdiction, double punishment becomes irrelevant
because the court will always be bound by the sister jurisdiction's
interpretation of its own statutes.
Assume, for example, that a federal defendant who has been
tried and convicted of violating federal law now raises a claim of
double punishment in a federal court. If the double jeopardy clause
merely incorporates by reference whatever the federal legislature has
defined certain offenses and sentences to be, then in order to determine whether double punishment has occurred, the federal court
must interpret federal law. If its interpretation shows that the federal
legislature intended the offenses and sentences to accumulate, the defendant's punishment will be lawful both under federal law and
under the double jeopardy laws; if its interpretation shows that the
federal legislature did not intend the offenses and sentences to accu73. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139 (1980). See also 100 S. Ct. at 1136; Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
74. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. at 1139.
15. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1443-45 (1980) ((Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'
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mulate, the defendant's punishment will be unlawful under both federal law and the fifth amendment. In either event, the foregoing
notion of double punishment is superfluous because its conclusions
are always dependent upon the results already reached by means of
statutory interpretation. 76
Now assume, on the other hand, that a state-court defendant who
has been convicted of violating state law now raises a claim of
double punishment in a federal court. Since federal courts are
bound by state interpretations of state law, the federal court's analysis of double punishment can never come into play. If the state
courts have concluded that the state offenses and sentences were intended to accumulate, the federal court will have to accept their conclusion, because it has no constitutional basis for setting it aside. If
the state courts have already concluded that the state offenses and
sentences were not intended to accumulate, the defendant will have
already prevailed on his claim and will have nothing further to request from the federal court. In either event, the claim of double
punishment is irrelevant because it adds nothing to what the defendant has already received in state courts under state law.77
Fortunately, there exists still a third view of double punishment,
a view that falls in between the other two and yet avoids the
problems they present: the double jeopardy clause operates as a presumption against finding that domestic law intends multiple offenses
and multiple punishment, a presumption that can be overcome only
by "clear and unmistakable" 78 evidence that the domestic law intends offenses and sentences to be cumulated.79 This solution avoids
both horns of the dilemma. It frees the legislature to define offenses
ap.d parcel out sentences in the way the legislature desires, by requir76. [l]fthe only question confronting this Court is whether Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishments for rape and for felony murder based upon rape, this Court
need decide no constitutional question whatsoever.
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1443 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. To the extent that the Court implies that a state court can ever err in the interpretation of its own law and that such an error would create a federal question reviewable by
this Court, I believe it clearly wrong.
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1446 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
The only exception is in state criminal cases removed from prosecution to a federal court
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-1443 (1976). In that event, the federal court would have to construe
state law as applied to the defendant without any prior construction by a state court. The
double jeopardy clause would not in that event be irrelevant, but it would be superfluous,
because it would lead to no different construction of state law than the federal law would reach
anyway as a matter of statutory construction.
78. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 791 (1975).
79. For an excellent discussion of this theory, see Co=ent, Twice in Jeopardy, 15 YALE
L.J. 262 (1965).
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ing the courts to adhere to legislative schemes of punishment that are
"clear and unmistakable." 80 Yet it also permits the courts to reject
judicial interpretations of domestic law, by authorizing the courts to
subject multiple punishment to constitutional review, and to invalidate such punishment wherever the evidence for its intended existence is less than clear. 81
This principle, that the double jeopardy clause operates as a rebuttable presumption against multiple punishment, has several virtues. It is the only formulation of this facet of the double jeopardy
clause that can give constitutional content to the clause without intruding upon the legislature's authority to define offenses and penalties, because other constructions inevitably render the double
jeopardy clause either unduly intrusive or entirely meaningless. In
addition, it fully accords with the Supreme Court's decisions regarding double punishment. 82 Finally, it corresponds with comparable
80. The only constitutional limitations on the authority of the legislature to impose punishments that it clearly intends are limitations that are found in provisions of the Constitution
other than the double jeopardy clause. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436 n.3
(1980).
81. A constitutional presumption of this kind does not place a federal court in the untenable position of either passively parroting or wrongfully second-guessing a domestic court's
interpretation of domestic law, see notes 75-77 supra, because the substantive content of the
constitutional rule requires a court to strike down multiple sentences unless domestic law
"clearly and unmistakably" intends them. As an illustration, consider the constitutional rule
that courts must invalidate any criminal statute that is too vague to give citizens notice of the
kinds of conduct that are prohibited. When a·federal court examines a state criminal statute
for vagueness, it does not feel bound by the state court's determination as to the clarity of the
state statute. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding a Florida
vagrancy statute unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness), reversing Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (declaring that the state vagrancy statute was
not vague). At the same time, however, in determining vagueness a federal court is not entitled to disregard a state court's construction of its own statute. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414
U.S. 21, 22-23 (1973) ("For the purpose of determining whether a state statute is too vague and
indefinite to constitute valid legislation, 'we must take the statute as though it read precisely as
the highest court of the State has interpreted it' ") (citation omitted). Instead, while taking the
state statute to mean what the state court says it does, the federal court then goes on to decide
whether that interpretation renders the prohibition impermissibly vague. See 414 U.S. at 23
("When a state statute has been construed to forbid identifiable conduct . . . claims of impermissible vagueness must be judged in that light.").
The same is true of the presumption against double punishment. In applying the presumption, a federal court is not bound by a state court's determination as to the clarity of the state
legislature's intention to impose multiple punishment. At the same time, a federal court is not
free to reject the state court's interpretation of its own law. Instead, while accepting the state
court's determination of its own law, the federal court goes on to decide whether the state law
is sufficiently "clear and unmistakable" to justify the imposition of multiple punishment. See
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1439 (1980) (invalidating multiple punishment, not
because the domestic court's interpretation of domestic statutes was in obvious error, but because the domestic law as interpreted was not sufficiently clear under scrutiny of the double
jeopardy clause to justify multiple punishment).
82. The Court's decisions as to whether the state may impose multiple sentences for a
single course of conduct following a single trial fall into two categories: (I) cases in which the
Court rejects the claim of multiple punishment; and (2) cases in which the Court sustains the
claim of multiple punishment. I have found no cases in category (I) in which a claim of
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values underlying the constitutional prohibition of vague criminal
statutes83 and the constitutional rule that criminal statutes be nardouble punishment was rejected in the face of a legislative desire for single punishment; instead, the Court has rejected such claims where it has found that the legislature intended multiple punishment for a single offense. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975);
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 (1948);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640 (1946); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); United States v. Adams,
281 U.S. 202 (1930); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927); United States v. Daugherty,
269 U.S. 360 (1926); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915); Gavieres v. United States, 220
U.S. 338 (1911); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906). Perhaps the closest cases to the
contrary are Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (upholding consecutive sentences
under separate statutory provisions for a single sale of narcotics) and Holiday v. Johnston, 313
U.S. 342, 349 (1941) (stating that the erroneous imposition of cumulative sentences in a single
case raises no issue of double jeopardy) (dictum). Yet in Gore the majority held that it could
not "reasonably" be "maintained" that Congress intended that a single punishment be imposed for the conduct engaged in. 357 U.S. at 389. As for Holiday, the Court's statement was
not only dictum, 313 U.S. at 349, but it was made without any supporting authority whatsoever, and has not been cited as'authority by the Court in any subsequent decisions. To be sure,
Justice Rehnquist suggested in Whalen that Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173 (1958),
held that the erroneous imposition of multiple punishment raises " 'no constitutional issue.' "
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1444 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Examination
shows, however, that the Ladner Court was saying not that the erroneous imposition of multiple sentence can never present an issue of double.jeopardy, but rather that the alleged erroneous imposition of the multiple punishment in Ladner did not present such an issue because it
had not been properly raised by the defendant.
As for category (2), I have found no cases in which the Court sustained a claim of double
punishment where the legislature could reasonably be said to have intended multiple punishment; instead, the Court has sustained such claims where it has.found that Congress did no/
intend double punishment, see, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); Jeffers v.
United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218 (1952), or where it has not found congressional intent to impose multiple punishment, see,
e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). In all the cases cited to the contrary,
multiple punishments were imposed in the course of successive prosecution, rather than at a
single prosecution. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam); Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). These cases are distinguishable, however, because they present
issues not of multiple punishment, but of successive prosecutions. Whalen v. United States,
100 S. Ct. 1432, 1441 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. The void-for-vagueness decisions fall into two categories for our purposes: (I) cases in
which statutes are too vague to give persons notice of the kinds of conduct that are prohibited;
and (2) cases in which notice is immaterial, but in which statutes are too vague to give executive officials guidance as to what the legislature intended. See Amsterdam, Federal Conslllutiona/ Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Sia/us, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness,
Crimes of .Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 216-24 (1967).
It is the second category of cases that is pertinent here. When a court strikes down such
statutes for being unconstitutionally vague, it is not because the statutes fail to give persons
requisite notice, but because the statutes represent an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative
power to courts, prosecutors, and policemen to define crimes and punishment. See Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937). The real gravamen, in other words, is not that citizens will
not be able to conform their behavior to the requirements of the criminal law, but that prosecutors and courts will punish persons whom the legislature may not have clearly intended to
punish. This is the same constitutional principle that underlies the prohibition on multiple
punishment, viz., that the prosecutors and courts impose multiple punishments only where the
legislature's desire for them is "clear and unmistakable.''
Consider, for example, United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). The defendant in
Evans was charged with harboring an illegal alien in violation of a statute which "clcar[ly]"
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rowly construed. 84 Indeed, each o( these constitutional doctrines,
viz., the rebuttable presumption against double punishment, the prohibition of vague criminal statutes, and the canon of narrow construction for criminal statutes, are all part of the more general
principle that no one should be criminally punished except for conduct clearly prohibited by the domestic law, 85 and that when in
defined harboring to be a crime, but which was "neither clear nor . . . helpful" in designating
the respective punishment for harboring from among "the possible penal consequences Congress may have had in mind." 333 U.S. at 485. The defendant did not pretend that he lacked
notice that harboring illegal aliens was a crime; he admitted that he knew that harboring was
unlawful. He argued, instead, that although he had notice as to the nature of the prohibited
conduct, the courts had no clear guidelines as to the punishment Congress intended and, lacking such guidelines, should not proceed to impose a punishment that Congress did not intend.
The Court agreed. It invalidated the prohibition on harboring illegal aliens, on the ground
that the statute was so vague as to the intended punishment that no punishment could be
imposed without running the risk that the Court would be imposing a sentence that Congress
did not intend.
84. Toe so-called "rule of lenity" is often described as merely a rule of statutory construction, see Busic v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1753 (1980), but there is also authority that it
also operates as a constitutional canon of construction. Thus, both the majority of the Court in
Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980), and Justice Blackmun in concurrence took the
position that the Constitution precludes a court from deferring to a lower court construction of
a criminal statute if the consequence of such "customary deference" causes a court to impose
punishment the legislature did not "clearly" intend. 100 S. Ct. at 1436, 1439; 100 S. Ct. at 1440
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Moreover, as authority for the proposition that constitutional issues of multiple punishment cannot be resolved without reference to legislative intent, the
Whalen majority specifically cited Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955). 100 S. Ct. at
1436. The citation to Bell may be significant because, while Bell itself presented no constitutional issue of double punishment, it war the case in which the Court first announced the rule
of "lenity." Thus, in citing Bell (which was not a double jeopardy case) as authority for the
proper constitutional analysis of double punishment problems, the Wiza/en Court may have
been referring to the doctrine for which Bell is best known - the rule of lenity. Finally, in
explaining why it was inappropriate to defer the lower court's construction of the two statutes,
the Whalen majority emphasized that defendants have a "constitutional right" not to be "deprived of liberty as punishment for criminal conduct" except as "authorized" by the legislature. 100 S. Ct. at 1437. The Court's emphasis may be significant because, if the lower court's
interpretation of the statute had been taken at face value, Wiza/en was a case in which the
legislature had authorized the punishment. This implies that with respect to the interpretation
of criminal statutes, the Constitution precludes a court from accepting a lower court's interpretation at face value and requires, instead, that the court proceed with caution lest it punish a
person whom the legislature did not intend to punish.
85. It may be tempting to assume that no person may constitutionally be punished for a
criminal offense unless his conduct is prohibited not only by domestic law, but by domestic law
in a form of a statute (as opposed to a common-law crime). Indeed, the Court has ~uggested as
much, by stating that principles of separation of powers and due process prohibit the federal
courts and state courts from punishing persons except to the extent authorized by the legislature. See Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436-37 & n.4 (1980). This suggestion is
troublesome because it implies that common-law crimes (which still exist in nearly thirty
states) are all unconstitutional, something the Court has never intimated. See United States v.
Davis, 167 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948) (upholding a conviction in
the District of Columbia for the common-law crime of negligently permitting a prisoner to
escape); w. LA FAYE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW§ 9, at 61-69 (1972). It is
more plausible to assume, therefore, that the Wiza/en Court would uphold criminal punishment that was either clearly prescribed by the legislature or so clearly accepted as a commonlaw crime that legislative silence can be taken as implicit ratification. In either event, the
essential principle is that no person should be subjected to criminal punishment unless the
punishment is based on the kind of broad political consensus that is reflected in explicit or
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doubt, a court should construe criminal statutes so as to avoid the
risk of punishing a person for conduct the legislature has not proscribed. 86
The foregoing analysis finds support in Whalen v. United
States, 87 the most recent of the Court's double punishment cases.
The defendant in Whalen was simultaneously tried in the District of
Columbia for the local offense of felony murder (punishable by
twenty years to life imprisonment) and the lesser included felony of
rape (punishable by any term up to life in prison). He was convicted
of both o.ffenses and given consecutive sentences of twenty years to
life for felony murder, and fifteen years to life for rape. He appealed
to the D.C. Court of Appeals, arguing among other things that the
implicit legislative enactment. If this is what the Whalen Court meant, it lends further support
to the view that the Constitution contains a presumption against multiple punishment, a presumption that can be overcome only by a clear showing that the domestic law intends it to be
imposed.
86. This also suggests a role for the courts under the eighth amendment in reviewing the
length of criminal sentences. As things now stand, the Court appears to feel caught in the
dilemma between either abdicatingjudicial review of the length of criminal sentences, regard•
less of how disproportionate they may seem, or imposing its own subjective views on the states
by drawing lines where no objective criteria exist. The harshness of the dilemma was the
dominant theme in Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980), the most recent of the Court's
constitutional decisions regarding the length of sentences. Und~r Texas law, the defendant in
Rummel received a mandatory life sentence as a two-time recidivist for having been convicted
of three separate crimes of larceny. He challenged his sentence, arguing that a life sentence
was grossly disproportionate and, therefore, cruel and unusual as a punishment for what were
essentially three nonviolent and "petty" property offenses. The Court approached the case as
if it had only two choices: either to abstain from all judicial review of the length of sentences,
or to draw arbitrary lines unsupported by objective criteria. The majority (per Justice Rehnquist) responded to the self-imposed dilemma by opting for the former, holding that, in the
absence of "objective criteria," any "line-drawing" would "merely" reflect the "subjective
views of individual Justices." 100 S. Ct. at 1140. The four dissenters (per Justice Powell)
opted for the other horn of the dilemma, taking the view that the Texas sentence was so dispro•
portionate to the criminal sentences in other states and even in Texas itself, that it ''would be
viewed as grossly unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer" in the country. 100 S. Ct. at
1156 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Significantly, however, there is a way out of the Rummel dilemma, a way that lies down the
path the Court has followed in Whalen. The Court could have struck down the sentence of life
imprisonment on the ground that the sentence was so out of line with sentences in Texas and
elsewhere that the Court could not presume that the Texas legislature intended it to apply to
"petty property offenses" like Rummel's, leaving it open to the Texas legislature to come back
and make it clear prospectively that it did intend mandatory life sentences for defendants such
as Rummel. This solution would appear to satisfy both the majority and the dissenters in
·, Rummel. It would satisfy the majority because it would take the courts out of the business of
irrevocably imposing their "subjective" views on the popular branches of government, by giving legislatures the final say on the length of criminal sentences. Yet it would also satisfy the
dissenters because it would protect defendants from sentences that the courts believe "virtually
every layman and lawyer" would consider unjust, by protecting defendants from sentences
that do not enjoy wide political support. (If the Texas legislature were to respond by reaffirm•
ing its statute - in the way state legislatures responded to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), by re-enacting death penalty statutes - the dissenters in Rummel would presumably
conclude that they were wrong in believing that the life sentence would be viewed as "grossly
unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer'' in the country.)
87. 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980).
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combined sentences violated congressional intent by cumulating
punishments that Congress intended to merge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding as a matter of statutory interpretation that Congress intended the two crimes to be separately
punishable. The defendant sought further review in the United
States Supreme Court arguing (1) that Congress did not intend the
two crimes to be separately punished, and (2) that even if Congress
did so intend, the imposition of consecutive sentences subjected him
to double punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause.
A majority of the Court, while ruling for the defendant, rejected
both of the standard arguments usually advanced in the area of
double i:,unishment. The Court refused to say (as Justice Blackmun
said in concurrence) that the double jeopardy clause "on!y" 88 serves
to incorporate by reference whatever the legislature intends regarding the calculation of punishment; similarly, the Court refused to say
(as Justice White said in concurrence) that the case could be decided
purely on statutory grounds. 89 Instead, the Court based its decision
squarely on the double jeopardy clause, emphasizing that the double
jeopardy clause "at the very least" 90 precludes a court from imposing
multiple sentences where the legislature intends a single sentence.
On the other hand, the Court also refused to say (as the defendant
said in argument) that the double jeopardy clause defines punishments and sentences independently of legislative intent. Instead, the
Court emphasized that "the question whether punishments imposed
by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are
unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining
what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized." 91
Where, then, did this leave the Whalen Court? What role was
left for the double jeopardy clause? If the double jeopardy clause
does not passively incorporate legislative intent by reference, and if
it does not prescribe independent standards of its own, what does it
do? The answer is that while the double jeopardy clause prohibits
the courts from imposing multiple punishment where the legislature
does not intend it, and while it permits the courts to impose multiple
punishment where the legislature "clearly" 92 intends it, it operates in
all middle areas as a presumption against multiple punishment. It is
a constitutional rule of construction that reverses the "customary
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

100 S.
100 S.
100 S.
100 S.
100 S.

Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.

at
at
at
at
at

1441 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
1440 (White, J., concurring).
1436.
1436.
1439.
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deference" 93 owed to domestic interpretations of domestic law, requiring, instead, that courts strike down multiple punishments unless
the domestic law "clearly"94 intends them to be imposed. 95
Now back to the starting question: given the constitutional values that are understood to underlie the prohibition of double punishment, what effect does the prohibition have on the alleged authority
of the state to appeal criminal sentences? The answer is that it has
none at all. The prohibition of double punishment is part of a larger
constitutional presumption of lenity in the criminal law, a presumption against punishing defendants in excess of the true intention of
the domestic law. The presumption against double punishment
serves to protect defendants from receiving multiple sentences where
domestic intent is less than "clear and unmistakable." Needless to
say, this rebuttable presumption against multiple sentence has no
bearing on the authority of the government to appeal a single sentence. When the government appeals a criminal sentence for alleged
abuse by the sentencing judge, it is not asking the appellate court to
conjoin a new and complete sentence to the sentence already imposed at trial. It is not seeking multiple sentences of any kind at all,
much less multiple sentences unauthorized by domestic law. It is
seeking a single, authorized sentence; it is asking the appellate court
to replace an allegedly abusive sentence with a single lawful one.
93. 100 S. Ct. at 1436. Justice White, concurring separately, agreed that the lower court's
determination of legislative intent was "not entitled to the usual deference," but not for the
constitutional reason stated by the majority. He would have justified disregarding the lower
court's construction purely on the statutory ground that the lower court had made an egregious
error in interpreting the statute. 100 S. Ct. at 1440 (White, J., concurring) (citing Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 369 (1974)). The majority, in contrast, did not review the lower
court's interpretation because it thought the'lower court made an "obvious error," Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 369 (1974), but because the double jeopardy clause required the
Court to make an independent determination of legislative intent 100 S. Ct. at 1436. Compare 100 S. Ct. at 1440 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agree1ng that no deference was owed to the
lower court, both for the constitutional reason stated by the majority and for the statutory
reason stated by Justice White). In other words, the Whalen majority reviewed and reversed
the lower court's interpretation of the District of Columbia statute, not because the interpretation was in "obvious error," but because it was not so "clearly" correct as to justify the imposition of multiple punishment.
94. 100 S. Ct. at 1439.
95. This view of the double jeopardy clause in the area of multiple punishment - like the
analogous view of the eighth amendment, see note 86 supra - is not an aberrant notion of
judicial review. It is part of a broader judgment that the proper function of judicial review is
not to abstain from the imposition of substantive values (if that is even possible) or to have the
final say on substantive values, but to articulate substantive values in the context of procedures
that permit the political branches to have the final say if they feel strongly to the contrary. See
Tushnet, .Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Harl Ely lo Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1058-59 (1980) (discussing the" 'suspensive' veto" school of constitutional theory). }1ut cf. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ofProcess-Based Constitutional Theo•
ries, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (implicitly denying the possibility that the courts can articulate
substantive values without also having the final say in imposing such values).
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Accordingly, as long as the government's avenue of appeal is clearly
authorized by the domestic law, and as long as the appellate court's
superseding sentence is also authorized, the increase in sentence on
appeal presents no issues of double punishment.
This does not mean that the double jeopardy clause necessarily
permits the government to appeal a criminal sentence. It means,
rather, that such appeals are not prohibited by either the rule regarding "acquittals," or the rule regarding double punishment, and that
if such appeals are prohibited by double jeopardy, it must be because
of some third principle of double jeopardy yet to be discussed.
C.

Finality

To establish a double jeopardy claim against a government appeal of sentence, a defendant is left to proceed under the third of the
double jeopardy values - the ever-present interest of a defendant in
finality. When a defendant challenges a government appeal of sentence, he is not suggesting that the trial judge speaks with such an
authoritative voice that his sentences should be absolutely final (as
would be true of the jury's verdict of not guilty). Nor is he suggesting that the substitution of an increased sentence on appeal violates the intent of the domestic law (as would be true of a multiple
punishment). He is asserting, instead, that any further inquiry into
sentence following the sentencing proceeding at trial would cause
him undue anxiety. Even if the trial judge's sentence is flawed, and
even if it could be replaced on appeal by a single and lawful domestic sentence, the trial judge's sentence should stand (the defendant
would say) because any further litigation to correct it would impose
an undue "ordeal" 96 on him. In short, the defendant is relying upon
what the Supreme Court calls a defendant's interest in "finality":97
an interest in an end to the "embarrassment, expense and . . . anxiety"98 of criminal prosecution.
The finality value of double jeopardy is unique in several ways.
For one thing, it is essentially more indigenous to the double jeopardy clause than its two companion values. The other values of
double jeopardy are essentially derivative. The prerogative of the
criminal jury to acquit against the evidence, though enforced
through the jury acquittal rule of double jeopardy, has its true origin
96. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
97. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
98. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
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in the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.99 Similarly, the presumption against double punishment, though operating through the
double jeopardy clause, is essentially an aspect of a broader constitutional presumption against punishing defendants in excess of domestic command. 100 The finality value, in contrast, is not derivative, but
originates directly in the double jeopardy clause. Perhaps that is
what the Court means in saying that the principle of finality is at the
"heart" 101 of the double jeopardy clause.
Furthermore, the problems of finality are significantly different
from other problems of double jeopardy. The difficulty with acquittals and double punishment is to identify the precise nature of the
constitutional values that underlie the two rules. Once the respective
99. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (to enter a
judgment of conviction notwithstanding a jury verdict of acquittal, or to retry a defendant
following a jury verdict of acquittal, would violate both a defendant's sixth amendment right
to trial by jury and his right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense). To say
that the double jeopardy guarantee is derivative means that it depends entirely for its scope and
content on an anterior notion of right to trial by jury. That explains why the government may
take an appeal from a trial judge's finding of not guilty while not being able to appeal from a
jury verdict of not guilty: the double jeopardy rules regarding government appeals derives not
from any notion regarding the finality of a trial judgment, but from a sixth amendment notion
regarding the finality of jury verdicts. Thus, if the sixth amendment were amended in such a
way as to eliminate any prerogative in the jury to acquit against the evidence, the double
jeopardy rules regarding the finality of jury verdicts of acquittal would lose their constitutional
foundation and, to be coherent, would have to be altered to bring them into line with the rules
governing the finality of favorable rulings from the bench. Conversely, the sixth amendment
notions of trial by jury do not depend on preexisting or coexisting rules of double jeopardy.
Assume, for example, that the federal courts re-embraced the procedural rules by which they
operated during the first half of the nineteenth century, rules that contain no provision for
appeals by either the plaintiff or defendants in criminal cases. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D,
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34-35 (2d ed.
1973). In that event, double jeopardy rules regarding government appeals of jury verdicts of
not guilty would not exist because there would be no basis for their ever coming into play, Yet
the constitutional prohibitions on directed verdicts and on other jury-control devices designed
to prevent a jury from acquitting against the evidence would still operate as fully as ever
because they derive, not from fifth amendment notions of double jeopardy, but from anterior
sixth amendment notions of right to trial by jury.
This insight into the derivative nature of the jury-acquittal rule may also help illuminate
the nature of the double jeopardy rules against government appeals of a judge's rulings in a
defendant's favor. Justice Marshall has argued that it violates the due process clause to isolate
the judge who actually hears evidence from the judge who eventually finds the facts based on
the evidence. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 229-32 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
other words, while appellate courts may reverse trial judges for legal errors, appellate courts
may not reverse trial judges for factual rulings that depend upon trial assessments of demeanor
and credibility. If Justice Marshall is right, a judge's factual rulings in a defendant's favor,
which the due process clause requires be final, could not be appealed by the government without also violating the double jeopardy clause. See Cooper, Government Appeals in Criminal
Cases: The 1978 .Decisions, 81 F.R.D. 539, 549-59 (1979) (suggesting that the Court's recent
double jeopardy decisions can be rationalized on the ground that trial judges have final authority to find facts). Again, however, if such appeals violate double jeopardy, it is only because the double jeopardy clause incorporates by reference the due process limitations that
otherwise apply to the redetermination of factual findings by trial judges in criminal cases.
100. See notes 82-86 supra.
101. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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values are identified, the rest is easy because there is no dispute
about the weight the values deserve. The converse is true of finality.
Problems of finality are difficult, not because of uncertainty regarding the nature of the finality interest, but because of uncertainty regarding its weight. Everyone understands the nature of a
defendant's interest in finality: it is his interest in seeing that crimi, nal proceedings against him are brought to an end, "once and for
all." 102 The real problem is to ascertain how much weight finality
deserves when finality is juxtaposed (as it almost always is) against
"society['s] . . . valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished."103
·
The task of ascribing weight to finality can be illustrated by reference to imaginary systems in which the problems of weight are absent. Imagine, for example, that a system believes that a defendant's
interest in finality is nearly absolute and, hence, that the prosecution
should be confined to having a single opportunity to obtain the judgment and sentence it seeks. 104 No court in such a system would ever
have to weigh or balance a- defendant's interest in finality against
"the public interest in assuring that each defendant shall be subject
to a just judgment on the merits of his case," 105 because the defendant's interest would always prevail. Once prosecuted, a defendant
would be entitled to immunity from reprosecution any time his initial trial happened to end in a mistrial, whatever the grounds for the
mistrial. 106 Once convicted, a defendant would be entitled to immunity from reprosecution any time his conviction was reversed on appeal, whatever the grounds for reversal. 107 Once convicted and
sentenced, a defendant would be entitled to immunity from review
of his initial sentence, however illegal the sentence might be.
Now imagine, conversely, that a legal system believes that a soci102. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion).
103. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
104. This was apparently the view accepted by Justice Murphy. See Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 694 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
105. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978).
106. See note 104 supra. Also, see United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 613 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (taking the position that a defendant is immune from reprosecution following a mistrial, even if the mistrial was declared at his request, if he requested the mistrial in
response to a government error); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting) (taking the position that a defendant is immune from reprosecution following a
mistrial declared over his objection whenever the mistrial can be attributed to fault on the
government).
107. This appears to be the rule in England, namely that a defendant cannot be retried
following the reversal of his conviction on appeal. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
473 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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ety's interest in "insuring that the guilty are punished" 108 is nearly
absolute and, hence, that society should have a "complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws." 109 Again, no court
would have to weigh or balance the state's interest against the defendant's interest in finality, because the state would always win: the
state would be allowed to retry a defendant - whether following a
mistrial, reversed conviction, or reversed ruling in the defendant's
favor - whenever it could show that the defendant's "guilt is
clear," 110 and, hence, that the prior proceedings did not "end in just
judgments." 111
The American doctrine of double jeopardy eschews both of the
aforementioned extremes. The double jeopardy clause represents a
"balancing" 112 of the defendant's interest in finality against "the societal interest in [law enforcement]." 113 One must weigh the gravity
of the state's interest in further prosecution against the magnitude of
the defendant's interest in finality, 114 while taking into account both
the potential risks of official abuse 115 and the possibility of adopting
less drastic alternative means. 11 6
108. See note 103 supra.
109. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). See Downum v. United States, 372
U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (taking the position that a defendant is never immune from reprosecution following a mistrial, even a mistrial declared over his objection,
unless the mistrial was deliberately engineered by the state for tactical purposes or for purposes of harassment).
110. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
111. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
112. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978); Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676,
680 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 477 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); Illinois v.
Somerville, 41.0 U.S. 458, 469-71 (1973).
113. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
114. Compare United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (state has a great interest in
being able to retry the defendant, because it has no other alternative for convicting the guilty),
with Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (state has no substantial interest in putting the defendant through two complete trials, because it could satisfy its interest by giving the juvenile
court judge authority to make a transfer decision without also giving him the authority to find
the defendant guilty). In addition, compare Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976)
(defendant has no substantial interest in finality regarding the initial proceeding because the
trial judge at the initial proceeding has no final authority to find him guilty), w,~lt Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (defendant has a substantial interest in the finality of the first proceeding because the juvenile judge at that proceeding has final authority to find him guilty).
See also Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 89 n.47.
I 15. Compare Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (where no possibility existed that
the mistrial was triggered by overreaching), with Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734
(1963) (where a real possibility existed that a mistrial was triggered in bad faith). See also
Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 92-93.
116. Compare United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (where appeal was the only
feasible mechanism for fulfilling the state's interest in an error free trial), with Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519 (1975) (where the state had alternative means for satisfying its interests in allowing a juvenile court judge to make a transfer decision for adult trial).
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The American law of double jeopardy is a product of such balancing. Thus, although the state may firmly believe it can prove a
defendant guilty if given another opportunity, it may not retry a defendant following a mistrial declared over his objection if the declaration was capable of being "manipulated . . . to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to strengthen its case"; 117 nor following a
declaration of any mistrial or the reversal of any conviction caused
by deliberate prosecutorial harassment or overreaching; 118 nor following a conviction for either exactly the same conduct 119 or nearly
the same conduct, 120 where the second prosecution is based solely on
the failure of coordinate governments to synchronize their
prosecutorial decisions; 121 nor following a trial that ultimately terminates in a basic failure of proof. 122 The reason for this, the Court
would say, is that "the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense."123
By the same token, although a defendant may fervently desire an
end to the ordeal of prosecution, he can be retried following a mistrial declared at his request for reasons other than deliberate
prosecutorial harassment or overreaching; 124 following the reversal
of a conviction for reasons other than deliberate harassment or overreachirig; 125 and following an erroneous dismissal of the charges in
his favor. 126 The reason for this, the court would say, is "that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not guarantee a defendant that the
Government will be prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the
social interest in law enforcement through the vehicle of a single pro117. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469 (1973).
118. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). See also Westen & Drube!,
supra note 58, at 102.
I 19. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
120. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). Although the state in Brown attempted to
reprosecute the defendants for a crime that contained additional elements not included in the
previous conviction, the Court nonetheless held retrial to be barred. Thus the Court implicitly
held that once a defendant has been tried and convicted for an offense, he cannot be retried for
crimes arising out of the same transaction - the "same transaction" being defined, at the very
least, as crimes so interconnected with regard to proof, that they consist in substantial part of
elements already put to proof in the previous trial. Accord, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
See Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 160-63.
121. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 n.4 (1977). The same is not true of governments sufficiently distinct that coordinating their prosecutorial decisions would impose an undue burden on them. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-22 (1978).
122. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I (1978).
123. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
124. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
125. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
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ceeding for a given offense." 127 In each case, the Court is striking a
balance between the defendant's interest in finality and the state's
contrary interest in nonfinality - sometimes favoring the former,
sometimes favoring the latter.
To resolve the validity of unilateral government appeals of sentence - indeed, to resolve any constitutional problem of finality in a
criminal case - one must first extract from the jurisprudence of
double jeopardy the controlling criteria of finality, and then apply
those general criteria to the particular issue at hand. The controlling
criteria, for present purposes, appear to be fourfold. 128 First, in
weighing a defendant's interest in finality against the state's interest
in prosecution, the Court gives special weight to the "expense" 129
and "anxiety" 130 entailed in an adversary presentation of evidence
on the general issue of guilt or innocence at trial. This heightened
concern for the "ordeal" 131 to a defendant of the trial phase of a
criminal proceeding is evidenced in several places: (a) in the rule to
the effect that ''jeopardy" (i.e., the personal "risk" 132 to a defendant
that is such as to require the prosecution to "shoulder" the
"heavy" 133 burden of justifying the termination and recommencement of a criminal proceeding) does not "attach" until the trial phase
actually begins; 134 (b) in the rule to the effect that ''jeopardy," having
once attached, comes to some extent to be unattached following the
completion of the trial phase; 135 (c) in the rule that an appellate court
may reverse a trial judge's finding of not guilty and enter a conviction in its place if the appellate court does so on the basis of the
record compiled at trial, but not if the appellate court reopens the
record for de novo fact-finding on appeal; 136 and (d) in the rule that
127. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483-84 (1971) (plurality opinion).
128. An additional criterion, which is not relevant to government appeals of sentence, is
whether the defendant is being deprived of his interest in being able "to go to the first jury and,
perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470,484 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (referring to a defendant's ''valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal"), This
particular criterion does not apply to government appeals of sentence because the appeal does
not occur until after a defendant has been heard and judged by the first jury impaneled,
129. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
130. 355 U.S. at 187.
13_1. 355 U.S. at 187.
132. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970).
133. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
134. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (per curiam).
136. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). The foregoing statement is not necessarily
inconsistent with the Court's decision in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), In that
case, the trial court, acting without a jury, had found the defendant not guilty. The Court held
that the appellate court's reversal of the acquittal had placed the defendant in double jeopardy,
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the state may subject a defendant to an involuntary two-tiered system of fact-finding if one of the tiers is merely a probable cause hearing (or the other tier is merely an appellate review on the record
compiled at trial), but not if each tier consists of a full trial on the
merits. 137
Second, in weighing a defendant's interests against the state's, the
Court allows the state to take an appeal from any erroneous ruling in
a defendant's favor that is otherwise appealable and that can be remedied on appeal without retrying the defendant or reopening the record.138 This willingness to allow further proceedings on the record
may be based on the belief that the burdens of an involuntary appeal
are qualitatively different (and less onerous) than the "personal
strain" 139 of trial, or because the appellate process is not subject to
the kinds of prosecutorial harassment, tactical manipulation, and
overreaching that may occur at trial. Whichever the reason, the state
may always take an appeal from an erroneous ruling by a judge in a
defendant's favor, including presumably an erroneous judgment of
acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence, provided that the appellate disposition merely has the effect of reinstating an existing and
valid jury verdict of guilty; 140 and the state may appeal an erroneous
finding of not guilty in a trial to the bench if the original trial record
is such as to permit the appellate court to reverse the trial court and
enter a finding of guilty without hearing new evidence. 141
Third, despite its genuine concern for the ordeal of trial, the
Court allows the state to retry a defendant following the reversal on
appeal of a judge's erroneous ruling not followed by a jury acquittal,
Kepner can be justified on one or both of two separate grounds: on the ground that the trial
judge's finding of not guilty was based on a personal assessment of raw facts of a kind that due
process precludes an appellate court from reviewing or disregarding on a cold record, see
discussion of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Swisher, supra note 99 and discussion of
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), infra note 146; or on the
ground that the trial judge's finding of not guilty was an exercise of a prerogative of nullification that the domestic law had vested in trial judges, see Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at
132-37.
137. Compare Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (two-tiered system allowed), with
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (two-tiered system not allowed).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332 (1975).
139. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion).
140. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 n.7 (1978); United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978). The Court in Scott distinguished United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564 (1977), on the ground that there was no outstanding jury verdict of guilty in
Martin Linen and, thus, reversal of the trial judge's ruling on sufficiency would have required
retrial. 437 U.S. at 90, 91 n.7. For further discussion of Martin Linen, see note 146 infra.
141. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). For a discussion resolving the inconsistencies between Swisher and Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), see note 136 supra.
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unless the error was the product of deliberate prosecutorial harassment or overreaching. This is clearly true where a ruling against a
defendant is reversed on appeal. 142 This is the famous Ball principle, the principle that distinguishes American criminal procedure
from systems (such as English criminal procedure) where the state
may not retry a defendant following the reversal of his initial conviction for lack of a fair trial. 143 Because of its antiquity, and because
its significance has until recently been masked by the fiction of
waiver, the Ball principle is only now being recognized for what it is:
the marking of a fundamental balance between a defendant's interest
in finality and the state's interest in prosecution. 144 Ball represents a
basic assessment that even though the state is responsible for denying a defendant a fair trial the first time around, the state's interest in
law enforcement is too great to justify immunizing a defendant from
reprosecution. The state is thus entitled to retry a defendant following a tainted trial unless he can show that the taint was a product of
deliberate harassment or overreaching. The classic statement comes
from Justice Harlan:
Certainly it is clear beyond question that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not guarantee a defendant that the Government will be
prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the social interest in law
enforcement through the vehicle of a single proceeding for a given offense. Thus, for example, reprosecution for the same offense is permitted where the defendant wins a reversal on appeal of a conviction.
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) . . . . The determination to
allow reprosecution in these circumstances reflects the judgment that
the defendant's double jeopardy interests, however defined, do not go
so far as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources
that it will be prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding free
from harmful governmental or judicial error. 145

Significantly, the Court also allows the state to retry a defendant
following the reversal on appeal of an erroneous ruling by a judge in
his favor, except where the ruling is followed by a jury acquittal or
where the ruling represents deliberate harassment or overreaching.
To be sure the foregoing statement is not entirely consistent with all
of the Court's recent decisions (because the Court's recent decisions
are not consistent with one another), 146 but it is the most coherent
142. See notes ll7-18, 124 supra.
143. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
144. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
811-12 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,466 (1964)),
145. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483-84 (1971) (plurality opinion).
146. See Cooper, supra note 99 (Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), is inconsistent with United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)); Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 151,
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principle that emerges from those decisions. 147 It is coherent because
it corresponds with the established balance of values - ie., the balance between a defendant's interest in finality and the state's interest
in prosecution - that underlies the Ball principle. It brings coherence to the jurisprudence of double jeopardy by rendering the two
lines of cases consistent with one another. It gives the state the same
right to retry a defendant following an erroneous ruling by a judge in
his favor as the state now has to retry him following an erroneous
judgment against him. And it does so based on the premise that
there is no distinction regarding either the defendant's interest in
n.304 (Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1977) (per curiam), is inconsistent with Swisher v.
Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978)).
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), may also be inconsistent
with whole lines of cases, depending upon how it is construed. If Marlin Linen means that
there can never be any further review of an erroneous ruling by a trial judge in a defendant's
favor if the ruling "represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements
of the offense charged," 430 U.S. at 571, it is inconsistent with United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978), holding that the government can appeal such a ruling ifit merely results in the
reinstatement of an existing and valid verdict of guilty. If Marlin Linen means that there can
never be any further review of such a ruling ff review would lead to "further proceedings of
some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense
charged," United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975), overruled, United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978), it is inconsistent with Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975),
which holds that the government can appeal such rulings, despite such "further proceedings."
If Marlin Linen means that there can be no further review of such a ruling if it leads to "further proceedings," and ff jeopardy has already once attached, it is inconsistent with United
States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976), which holds that the government can review such a
ruling even if it leads to "further proceedings" and even though jeopardy has already once
attached, provided that the government is not at fault for the way in which the initial proceeding terminated.
In my judgment, there is only one way in which Martin Linen can be reconciled with the
surrounding jurisprudence of double jeopardy, and even that way is not entirely satisfactory.
One can argue that what distinguishes the favorable ruling in Marlin Linen from all other
"resolution[s] . . . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged" is that the trial
judge in Marlin Linen was not merely making a legal ruling; he was also making a factual
ruling. That is, in ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, he was not simply applying the
sufficiency standard to the facts as they uncontestedly appeared in the record; he was also
making some personal factual assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence. If one
is prepared to assume that that is what the trial judge did, it explains several things. It explains
why the government could not take an appeal from the ruling on insufficiency: appellate
courts are simply in no position to review or reverse trial judges for rulings that are based on
determinations of credibility that do not appear in the record. See discussion of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 229-32 (1978), supra note 99; and
Cooper, supra note 99, at 549-50. It also explains why the double jeopardy clause precluded
the government from simply retrying the defendant: the prior proceeding had terminated in
an unreversed (and unreversible) finding that there was insufficient evidence by which the jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The only difficulty with the foregoing explanation for Marlin Linen is that it conflicts with the general rule that in passing on
sufficiency of the evidence, federal judges should not make determinations of credibility or
weight of evidence. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Bui see United States v.
Melillo, 275 F. Supp. 314, 319-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). For a further discussion of the foregoing
explanation, for Marlin Linen, see Westen & Drube!, supra note 58, at 151-54.
147. To say that the principle is "coherent" means that it harmonizes with the well-accepted principles that underlie the Court's decisions in related lines of double jeopardy decisions.
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finality or the state's interest in prosecution that justifies according
greater finality to an erroneous judge-made ruling in a defendant's
favor than to an erroneous ruling against him. 148
Finally, the Court does not allow the state to subject a defendant
to retrial on guilt or innocence if the state's reasons for desiring a
retrial are both systemic (as opposed to being accidental) and avoidable (as opposed to being in necessary furtherance of an important
state interest). Thus, the state in Breed v. Jones 149 was not allowed to
subject a juvenile delinquent to a second full trial on the issue of
guilt or innocence where the second trial was made necessary by a
bifurcated system in which the juvenile court judge did not decide
until the end of the first trial whether to make a binding determination of guilt or innocence or to transfer the case to an adult court for
trial de novo. The state's reasons for retrying the juvenile delinquent
in Breed were both systemic and avoidable: systemic, because the
second trial was a predictable, deliberate, and essentially desired feature of the state's regime for processing juvenile delinquents; avoidable because the state's interest in giving the juvenile court judge an
option between trying a defendant and transferring him for trial to
an adult court could have been served by allowing the juvenile judge
to conduct a separate transfer proceeding in advance of any trial on
guilt or innocence.1so
Breed is thus to be distinguished from United States v. Ba/1, 151
where the second trial was made necessary by the occurrence of
prejudicial error against the defendant in the first proceeding. The
basis for the retrial in Ball was accidental (rather than systemic),
because it was unpredictable, unintended, and undesired. The retrial in Ball was also unavoidable, not because the state had any
necessary interest in committing the error, but because criminal trials
148. See notes 17-35, 37-40 supra and accompanying text. See Comley, Former Jeopardy, .
35 YALE L.J. 674, 677-79 (1926); Cooper, supra note 99, at 550, 555; Fisher, Double Jeopardy:
Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 UCLA L. REV. 81, 83, n.4 (1967); Horack, Prosecution
Appeals in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L. Q. 50, 52-60 (1934); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari:
New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. I, 8-15, authorities cited at 4 n.11
(1960); Miller, Appeals by the Stale in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 493-97, 504-05 (1927);
Note, Right ofa State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 473, 479-82 (1959),
149. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
150. 421 U.S. at 535-41. The evil of the bifurcated procedure in Breed was precisely its
predictability. If a defendant knows in advance that he may well be subjected to two separate
and complete trials, he faces a dile=a. If he discloses his whole case in the trial to the
juvenile judge (and the juvenile judge then transfers the case to adult court), the defendant
gives the prosecution gratuitous discovery of his case. On the other hand, if the defendant
withholds his defense from the juvenile judge (and the juvenile judge does not transfer), the
defendant foregoes his opportunity to put on a defense. This dile=a does not arise when the
second proceeding is the unanticipated consequence of accidental error.
151. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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are too elaborate and protective of defendants to be easily administered on an error-free basis. 152 The difference between Breed and
Ball is that retrial in Breed was based on a desired and consciously
chosen feature of a particular procedural system, while retrial in Ball
was based on an undesired and unavoidable defect in all procedural
systems. The difference is that the unanticipated reasons for retrial
in cases like Ball can never be wholly eliminated as long as criminal
trials are as complex as they are.
Now what does this all mean for government appeals of sentence? How do the foregoing criteria of finality bear on the authority
of the government to unilaterally appeal a defendant's sentence for
the purpose of increasing the sentence? The answer by now is plain:
even if one assumes, arguendo, that a defendant's finality interest in
the length of his sentence is as great as his finality interest in guilt or
innocence, 153 none of the criteria set forth above weigh against the
appeal of sentence in JJiFrancesco. The appeal will not necessarily
result in a repetition of the ordeal of trial because the appellate court
is authorized to order an increase in sentence based on the record as
compiled by the sentencing judge, without either taking any new evidence itself or remanding for further fact-finding. 154 This presents
no problem of double jeopardy, because it is now understood that
the government may always appeal an erroneous ruling in a defendant's favor (other than a jury verdict of not guilty), as long as the
appeal results in an entry on the record of a ruling that was lawfully
mandated in the first place.
Moreover, even if the appellate court in JJiFrancesco remands for
152. As Justice Harlan observed, there is a mutual relationship between the willingness of
the system to accord defendants complex and rigorous trial rights, on the one hand, and its
ability to retry him if, perchance, the defendant is convicted as a result of error in the implementation of those rights. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 {1964):
From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be
as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial or
pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably
beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the practice of retrial serves
defendants' rights as well as society's interest.
153. For the suggestion that this assumption is not warranted, see notes 66, 68 supra, and
175-83 iefra.
154. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976), is not entirely clear on this issue. While providing for the increase in sentence on appeal, § 3576 also stipulates that no such increase shall be
imposed by an appellate court "except ... after [a] hearinlf' (emphasis added). Although
"hearing" is ambiguous, legislative history suggests that it refers to an appellate court hearing
(rather than to a trial court hearing on remand). See Organized Crime Control· Hearings on
S.30 Before Suhcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 174
(1970) (statement of Attorney General Mitchell). The former construction is also more sensible because some increases in sentences - such as the imposition of mandatory prison terms
or special parole terms in cases in which the trial judge 01nitted them - do not involve discretion or the taking of evidence and would render any further "hearing" on remand in the trial
entirely superfluous.

1044

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 78:1001

further fact-finding in connection with an increase in sentence, it will
do so only where it can show that the trial judge's favorable sentence
was either "clearly erroneous" as a matter of fact or an "abus[e]" of
discretion as a matter of law. 155 Again, this presents no problem of
double jeopardy, for the government should be allowed to retry a
defendant following an erroneous ruling in his favor for the same
reasons it may retry a defendant following an erroneous ruling
against him: in the absence of deliberate harassment or overreaching, "the defendant's double jeopardy interests . . . do not go so far
as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources that
it will be prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding free
from harmful governmental or judicial error." 156
Finally, even if the appellate court in .DiFrancesco were to remand for a new sentencing hearing, the remand would be based on
events that were both accidental (rather than systemic) and unavoidable. The government's appeal in .DiFrancesco was not the product
of a systemic desire for two sentencing hearings; it was not the product of a bifurcated procedure used to enable components of the system to work at their best. Nor was the appeal based on a preference
for two hearings where one hearing would serve the state's interest
equally well. Rather, the government appeal of sentence in
JJiFrancesco is an effort to cope with unintended, undesired and unavoidable defects in the original sentencing stage. It is an effort to
cope with errors of the kind that will always occur, regardless of how
refined a procedural system may be. It is designed to serve a state
interest that cannot be adequately served by any alternative means.
The statutory scheme utilizes appellate review of sentences for the
same reason it resorts to appellate review of convictions: appellate
review (and remand, where appropriate) is the only feasible mechanism for insuring the integrity and uniformity of sentencing standards. In short, just as retrial was justified in Ball in response to an
accidental and unavoidable trial-court error, resentencing is justified
in JJiFrancesco in response to the comparable error in sentencing
that was alleged to have occurred there. 157
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (Supp. 1980). For differences between reversal for "abuse of discre•
tion" and reversal for "illegality," see note 157 i'!fro.
156. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (plurality opinion).
157. Ironically, the best authority for this proposition, Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S.
160, 166-67 (1947), is often overlooked because of a misconception as to what an appellate
court really does when it reverses a sentence for "abuse of discretion." The Bozzo Court held
that it does not violate double jeopardy for a trial judge to take the initiative in increasing a
sentence if the increase is "required" in order to replace an "invalid punishment" with a
"valid" one. 330 U.S. at 167. The United States Court of Appeals in DiFroncesco distinguished Bozzo on the ground that the original sentence in Bozzo was "invalid," while the
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The purpose of the foregoing theory is to bring coherence to the
jurisprudence of double jeopardy. The ultimate test of its validity,
therefore, is its usefulness in rationalizing and simplifying complex
cases. North Carolina v. Pearce 158 is such a case, because Pearce not
only appears to implicate each of the three component values of
double jeopardy, but does so in the particular context of a defendant's objection to an increase in sentence. Thus, an analysis of
Pearce will not only cast light on the usefulness of a tripartite theory
of double jeopardy, but will illuminate the particular issue of government appeals of sentence as well.
The essential facts of Pearce are simple. The defendant was tried
and convicted in state court in 1961 for aggravated assault and sentenced to a term of twelve to fifteen years in prison. Four years later
he initiated post-conviction proceedings which resulted in an appellate reversal of the conviction on the ground that evidence had been
introduced against him at trial in violation of his privilege against
self-incrimination. Following the reversal of his conviction, Pearce
was retried, convicted, and sentenced in 1966 to a flat term of fifteen
years in prison with credit for the some seven years he had already
sentence in .DiFrancesco was "within that legally authorized." United States v. DiFrancesco,
604 F.2d 769, 781 n.14 (2d Cir. 1979}, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). The distinction is
unpersuasive. The government argues that after finding DiFrancesco to be a dangerous special offender, the trial judge abused his discretion under the dangerous special offender statute
by giving DiFrancesco a sentence for racketeering that was only one year longer than the
concurrent sentence DiFrancesco was already serving, and that was no longer than the sentence DiFrancesco could have received as a nondangerous and ordinary offender. That is, the
government argues that the trial judge exceeded :his lawful authority under the dangerous
special offender statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976), by giving DiFrancesco a sentence that was
legally insufficient as measured by the statute's aggravated sentencing standards. If the government is correct in its assertion, the trial judge's sentence in .DiFrancesco was just as invalid
as the sentence in Bozza. A sentence which is the product of an "abuse of discretion" under
prevailing legislative standards is as unlawful as a sentence which violates the explicit terms of
a sentencing statute. See generally Greenawalt, .Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Illusive
Questfar the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975). It makes no difference
that the alleged sentencing standard in lJiFrancesco is one that must be inferred from the
dangerous special offender statute by process of statutory interpretation, because once the statute is so construed, the resulting sentencing standard is just as much a part of the statute as the
legislative standard in Bozza. Thus, the only difference between the two cases is that the sentence in Bozza was invalid on its face (ie., necessarily invalid, given the sentencing standards
of the pertinent statute), while the sentence in lJiFrancesco is allegedly invalid as applied, (i.e.,
invalid, given an application of the pertinent sentencing standard to the facts). This distinction
between facial invalidity and invalidity as applied may be meaningful for some purposes, but it
is difficult to see why it should make any difference for double jeopardy purposes. Cf.
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1914) (in response to a defendant's appeal on
the record, an appellate court may increase the defendant's sentence on grounds of abuse of
discretion without violating the double jeopardy provisions of the congressionally enacted
Philippine Bill of Rights).
158. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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served in prison. 159 Thus, having originally received a sentence in
1961 which would have permitted him to have been released on parole after twelve years in prison, Pearce was given a new sentence
following his retrial and reconviction in 1966 which required that he
spend a total of fifteen years in prison. He challenged the new sentence, arguing that by increasing his original sentence, the state had
twice held him in jeopardy for the same offense. The state admitted
that the second sentence was harsher than the first, but denied that
the new sentence violated the principles of double jeopardy.

A.

Implicit Acquittal

One should approach Pearce in the way one approaches all complex double jeopardy cases. One must identify the separate values of
double jeopardy, ascribe to them their respective weights, and then
apply the resulting standards to the particular issue in dispute. Beginning with the first of the double jeopardy values, Pearce challenged the increase in sentence on the ground that it violated the
prohibition against further prosecution following an acquittal. He
based the challenge on an analogy to the rule in Green v. United
States 160 that a defendant who is convicted by a jury of a lesserincluded offense, and whose conviction is set aside on appeal, may
not be retried on the greater offense of which he was "implicit[ly]" 161
acquitted by the jury. Just as the jury in Green implicitly acquitted
Green of any greater offense by explicitly convicting him solely of
the lesser offense (so Pearce argued), the sentencing judge at Pearce's
original trial should be understood to have implicitly acquitted him
of any greater sentence by explicitly giving him a sentence of twelve
to fifteen years in prison. As Justice Harlan stated, agreeing with
Pearce:
Every consideration enunciated by the Court in support of the decision in Green applies with equal force to the situation at bar. In each
instance, the defendant was once subjected to the risk of receiving a
maximum punishment, but it was determined by legal process that he
should receive only a specified punishment less than the maximum. . . . And the concept or fiction of an "implicit acquittal'.' of the
greater offense [in Green] applies equally to the greater sentence [in
Pearce]: in each case it was determined at the former trial that the
159. The credit of seven years was based on (1) the time spent in jail between the time of
arrest and the entry of conviction, (2) time served in prison between conviction and the entry
of the new sentence following retrial, and (3) credit earned for good time. See 395 U.S. at 713
n.l; State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 708, 151 S.E.2d 571,572 (1966) (per curiam); State v. Pearce,
266 N.C. 234, 236-37, 145 S.E.2d 918, 920-21 (1966).
160. 355- U.S. 184 (1957).
161. 355 U.S. at 190.
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defendant or his offense was of a certain limited degree of "badness" or
gravity only, and therefore merited only a certain limited punishment.162
The Pearce majority passed over this argument in complete silence, thereby raising a question in some minds as to whether Green
(and the principle of implicit acquittal) could be satisfactorily distinguished from a subsequent increase in sentence. 163 Yet by now the
distinctions are plain. The controlling difference between the
favorable original verdict in Green and the favorable original sentence in Pearce - and the reason the former was absolutely final
and the latter was not - is that Green involved a favorable verdict
by a jury on an issue of guilt or innocence, while Pearce involved a
favorable ruling by a judge on a matter of sentence. The reason jury
verdicts of acquittal are absolutely final is not because they are
favorable, or because they are thought to be reliable, or because the
defendant has actually relied on them, or because he should be entitled to rely on them. They are final because any effort to set them
aside would intrude upon the jury's exclusive prerogative to acquit
against the evidence. By the same token, the reason why favorable
rulings by a judge are not absolutely final - and the reason why
erroneous acquittals and erroneous findings of not guilty by judges
can be set aside - is that judges do not possess comparable constitutional authority. And even if they did, the authority to acquit
against the evidence on issues of guilt or innocence would not necessarily attach to determinations of sentence. 164

In short, the defendant in Pearce fell into the trap that awaits all
who argue by analogy. He tried to benefit from the result in Green
by arguing that the two cases were essentially the same, without
making the effort to root either his own case or Green in the basic
values underlying the double jeopardy clause. He tried to avoid the
task of assessing fundamental values by riding piggyback on a decision which he said was not significantly different from his own. The
problem was that one can never tell whether two cases are .truly the
same for double jeopardy purposes without first understanding what
those purposes are; for one can never know whether one thing is like
another, or different from it, without first ascertaining the standard
that determines likeness and difference. Once the standards of
162. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 746 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
163. Four years later, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the defendant made
precisely the same argument based on Green that was implicitly rejected in Pearce, presumably because he felt tliat the Court had not fully considered it earlier. Once again, the Court
rejected it, this time explicitly. See 412 U.S. at 23-24.
164. See notes 65-68 supra.
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double jeopardy are identified, it becomes clear that a finding of not
guilty by a judge is not the same as an acquittal by a jury, and a
determination of sentence is not the same as a judgment of guilt or
innocence, because the determining standard is whether the trier of
fact has the prerogative to acquit against the evidence. The analogy
of Pearce to Green was fundamentally flawed because di.fferences
Pearce took to be trivial were in reality dispositive.
B.

The Prohibition of IJoub!e Punishment

Turning to the second of the double jeopardy values, the defendant in Pearce argued that his subsequent increase in sentence also
violated the prohibition of double punishment. He relied for authority on Ex parte Lange, 165 the first and still foremost decision regarding double punishment. The defendant in Lange was tried and
convicted by a jury for postal theft under a statute making the offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a
fine of not more than $200. The trial judge imposed a sentence of
one year in prison plus a $200 fine. The defendant immediately paid
the fine and commenced the serving of his sentence. Some five days
later, after the $200 payment had been deposited to the credit of the
United States and, thus, had passed irrevocably out of the court's
control, 166 the sentencing judge vacated the original sentence and
imposed a new sentence of one year in prison with no credit for the
five days already served and no provision for reimbursement of the
fine. The defendant sought relief in the Supreme Court, arguing that
the subsequent sentence of one year in prison violated the double
jeopardy clause. The Court, agreeing, held in memorable language
that by vacating the defendant's original sentence and resentencing
him to one year in prison, the trial .court punished Lange twice for
the same offense:
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and
America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same
offence. And though there have been nice questions in the application
of this rule to cases in which the act charged was such as to come
within the definition of more than one statutory offence, or to bring the
party within the jurisdiction of more than one court, there has never
been any doubt of its entire and complete protection of the party when
a second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts,
165. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
166. The Court in Lange assumed that the $200 fine, which had been deposited to the
credit of the Treasurer of the United States, could not be recalled by the Court and could not
be returned to the defendant without an act of Congress. See 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175; 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) at 200 (Clliford, J., dissenting).
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for the same statutory offence. 167
The defendant in Pearce argued that his case was directly analogous to Lange. Just as the state was prohibited in Lange from vacating the defendant's original sentence (a $200 fine plus one year in
prison) and replacing it with a longer sentence (a $200 fine plus one
year and five days in prison), so, Pearce argued, the state was prohibited in his case from vacating his original sentence of twelve to
fifteen years and replacing it with a flat sentence of fifteen years. As
Justice Harlan said in Pearce:
[l]t has long been established that once a prisoner commences service
of sentence, the [Double Jeopardy] Clause prevents a court from vacating the sentence and then imposing a greater one. 168
Not surprisingly, Pearce's analogy to Lange was flawed for the
same reason as his analogy to Green. It proceeded on the premise
that the similarities between Lange and Pearce predominated over
their differences, and yet it failed to root such similarities and differences in the purposes of double jeopardy. That is to say, the defendant in Pearce tried to argue that the two cases were alike in
significant ways (and different in insignificant ways) without articulating the double jeopardy standard for determining "likeness" in
the area of double punishment. Having once identified the controlling value, one discovers that Pearce is as different from Lange as it
is from Green.
As we have seen, the ban on double punishment is designed to
prohibit the state from doubling up on what the "law" defines as the
proper sentence for a given offense, the law being the domestic definition of offenses and penalties. By that standard, the defendant in
Lange was a victim of double punishment. He was punished twice
for a single offense - "twice" being defined by reference to the domestic law's own standards. The domestic law made his conduct
punishable by either a $200 fine or one year in prison. By imposing
a fresh one-year sentence without granting the defendant credit for
the $200 fine already paid, the trial judge effectively sentenced the
defendant to both a $200 fine and a year in prison. To that extent,
the judge imposed two penalties where the domestic law prescribed
only one. Indeed, even apart from the $200 fine, the judge's fresh
sentence of one year in prison still constituted double punishment
because it resulted in an effective sentence of one year plus five days
for an offense punishable by a maximum of one year. By imposing a
fresh sentence of one year in prison without giving the defendant
167. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168.
168. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 747 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

1050

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:1001

credit for the five days already served, the sentencing judge "doubled
up" on the defendant's sentence by causing him to serve five days of
his lawful one year sentence twice.
Not so in Pearce. There was no "doubling up" in Pearce. The
defendant there was not punished in excess of the domestic law, nor
was he given two penalties where the domestic law prescribed only
one. His original sentence of twelve to fifteen years was within the
statutory maximum of fifteen years. His subsequent sentence can be
stated, alternatively, as either a fifteen-year sentence with credit for
the seven years already served, or an eight-year sentence without
credit for the seven years served. In either event, the combined effect
of the new sentence and the old was fifteen years in prison, the precise term of the statutory maximum. It would have been double
punishment if the trial judge had given the defendant a fifteen-year
sentence without credit for the time served, or if he had given the
defendant a sentence which, when combined with the time already
served, would have exceeded fifteen years. 169 Since he did neither,
169. Interestingly, having reasoned that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to credit for
time already served if the denial of credit produces a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, the Pearce Court went on to hold in a companion case, Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), that a defendant is also constitutionally entitled to credit even if the denial does nol
produce a combined sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. As the Court put it, if the
state violates double jeopardy when it denies a defendant credit in such a manner as to produce a combined sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, "the same •.• holds true"
when the state denies a defendant credit in such a fashion as no/ to exceed the statutory maximum. 395 U.S. at 718.
At first glance, the Court appears to have been in error because the two cases are not at all
equivalent. If the purpose of double jeopardy is to protect the defendants from being punished
in excess of legislative intent, double jeopardy is not violated by a denial of credit that results
in a sentence that is well within legislative parameters. Indeed, this would seem to follow from
the Pearce Court's own recognition that unless statutory maximums are implicated, there is no
fanctional d!fference between, say, a ten-year sentence without credit for five years already
served and a fifteen-year sentence with credit for five years already served. See 395 U.S. at 719
n.14.
There is, nevertheless, an explanation for the Court's decision that a defendant is entitled to
credit even where statutory maximums are not implicated. It will be recalled that the trial
judge in Rice gave the defendant a sentence of twenty-five years in prison without credit for
the two and one-half years the defendant had already served. 395 U.S. at 714, 716. The trial
judge may have done so, not because he wanted to give the defendant a functional equivalent
of twenty-seven and one-half years with credit, but because he assumed that the legislature
wished him to treat all prior proceedings and sentences in the case as null and void. If the trial
judge was mistaken in his assumption, he ended up giving the defendant a sentence that exceeded what the legislature intended him to impose. Hence, absent clear evidence that a trial
judge intends to deny credit, or absent clear evidence that, in denying credit, the trial judge
gave the defendant the functional equivalent of the sentence he could and would have given
the defendant irrespective of any legislative desire to extend credit, the double jeopardy clause
requires that a defendant be credited with all portions of a sentence previously served. To that
extent, the requirement of credit is simply an aspect of the broader presumption against punishing a defendant in excess oflegislative intent, by operating to resolve in a defendant's favor
all doubts regarding the legislature's views regarding time already served. For further discussion of this point, see Westen & Drube), supra note 58, at 107-11.
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his new fifteen-year sentence was no more a violation of double punishment than an original fifteen-year sentence would have been.
C. Finality

Pearce was thus relegated to the third and last of the double jeopardy values, viz., the interest in .finality. The interest is easy to articulate: it is a need for "repose," 170 a desire to know the exact extent
of one's liability, an interest in knowing "once and for all" 171 how
many years one will have to spend in prison. The difficulty is not in
articulating the .finality value, but in weighing it against the state's
contrary interest in accurate punishment; because, as we have seen,
the .finality value of double jeopardy must be balanced against the
state's interest in the "punishment" of defendants "whose guilt is
clear." 172 Unfortunately, the Pearce Court made no explicit effort to
weigh the two interests or to explain why the state's interest in imposing a new sentence should predominate. It simply announced
that by appealing his original .conviction, the defendant at his own
"behest" 173 had caused "the slate" to be ''wiped clean." 174 To understand what the Court meant by "the slate" having been "wiped
clean," one must uncover the balance of values that lies concealed
under the Court's ipse dixit. One must assess the interaction of the
government's interest in resentencing and the defendant's interest in
.finality, as they are presented in the context of resentencing upon
retrial following the reversal of the defendant's original conviction
upon appeal.
As a start, a defendant appears to have less of a .finality interest in
determination of sentence than in the determination of guilt or innocence. This lesser degree of protection is apparently based on the
belief that a defendant has less of a legitimate interest in the precise
length of a sentence than in whether a sentence will be imposed at all
- less of an interest in getting out of prison early than in not going
to prison at all. Thus, a defendant enjoys more constitutional protection on the trial of his guilt or innocence than on the determination of his sentence, 175 and more constitutional protection regarding
170. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion).
172. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
173. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721.
174. 395 U.S. at 721.
175. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,358 & n.9 (1977) (plurality opinion). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. R.Ev. 821
(1968).
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the revocation of his parole than regarding his release on parole. 176
This differentiation also means that a defendant is assumed to
have a greater interest in knowing how he stands regarding guilt or
innocence than how he stands regarding the length of his sentence.
Thus, almost every state has statutes of limitation that require the
state to prosecute and try defendants within certain definite periods
of time; yet many also have indeterminate sentencing statutes that
permit the state to defer the fixing of sentence for indefinite periods
of time. 177 By the same token, while the states are under some constitutional obligation to prosecute and try defendants in a timely
fashion, they have no constitutional obligation to make sentences
definite within limited periods of time if doing so would frustrate
reasonable sentencing goals. 178 Thus, the state may give a defendant
a tentative parole release date, and then postpone it by reexamining
its assessment of him; 179 the state may give a defendant a tentative
parole release date, and then postpone it by revoking his earned
good time; 180 the state may fix a definite maximum for a previously
indeterminate sentence, and then rescind the designated maximum
by replacing it with a longer determinate or indeterminate term; 181
the state may release a defendant on conditional probation or parole,
and then increase the terms of his release by adding to the conditions
of his release; 182 the state may release a defendant on conditional
probation or parole, and then increase its duration by adding additional periods of time. 183 This all suggests that if a defendant has a
finality interest regarding the length of his sentence, it is less than his
finality interests regarding guilt or innocence, and, being less, it can
more easily be outweighed by a countervailing interest on the part of
the state.
As for the state, its interest in being able to increase a defendant's
sentence following reconviction is both greater and lesser than its
176. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation), with Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979) (parole release).
17'?. See generally Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Righi lo Treatment, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7 (1972).
178. See United States v. Howard, 577 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1978); Burgener v. California
Adult Auth., 407 F. Supp. 561, 564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Cf. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86
(1976) (federal parolee has no constitutional right to a prompt parole revocation hearing).
179. See, e.g., In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78,357 P.2d 1080, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1960), appeal
dismissed, 368 U.S. 10 (1961).
180. See S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 350-57 (2d ed. 1973).
181. See Sturm v. California Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 947 (1969); Hayes v. Field, 298 F. Supp. 309 (C.D. Cal. 1969); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,
418, 503 P.2d 921, 925, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (1972).
182. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 4209 (1976).
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976).
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interest in being able to retry him following the reversal of his original conviction. When a conviction is set aside on appeal, a defendant is restored to the position of legal innocence he enjoyed before
trial; unless the state is allowed to retry him, it must set him free
regardless of what the evidence may show regarding his guilt. To
that extent, the state's interest in retrying a defendant following the
reversal of his conviction on appeal is its "valid concern for insuring
that the guilty are punished." 184 With respect to resentencing, the
situation is different. If the state were not allowed to increase the
defendant's sentence following reconviction, it would not be denied
the power to give the defendant any sentence at all; it would merely
be confined to the ceiling represented by the presumptively valid
sentence the defendant received following his original trial. 185
On the other hand, the state may at times have a greater interest
in increasing a defendant's sentence than in retrying him. When a
state seeks to retry a defendant following the reversal of his original
conviction, it is essentially asking for an opportunity to give the defendant the kind of fair trial that it could and should have afforded
him the first time; it is asking for relief from the consequences of its
own error. In contrast, when the state seeks an increase in sentence,
it is not necessarily acknowledging that it committed an avoidable
error in setting the original sentence. Rather, it may be seeking to
take account of sentencing information that was not and could not
have been available originally. This is particularly true where
sentences are based on an ongoing reassessment of a defendant's
progress toward rehabilitation. The very institution of the indeterminate sentence is based on the belief that the kinds of information
needed for the fixing of a release date come to light during the course
of a defendant's behavior in prison and cannot be known at the time
of sentencing. Consequently, if the state were not allowed to readjust a defendant's expected release date from prison, including readjustments upward, it would be denied the flexibility it needs for
rehabilitation sentencing, through no fault of its own. 186
184. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. l, 15 (1978).
185. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 43 & n.5, 46 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. See In re McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 264, 271-72, 176 P.2d 40, 45 (1946) (dictum). To be
sure, it might be argued that the solution is to give a defendant such a long sentence at the
outset that no adjustment upwards will ever be necessary, or even possible. This, until recently, was the practice in California, where defendants convicted of major crimes were sentenced for indeterminate terms ofup to life in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1168 (West 1970),
amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West Supp. 1980). See generally Note, Sentencing
Criminals in Calffomia - A Study in Haphazard Legislation, 13 STAN. L. REV. 340 (1961).
This induced some courts to conclude that the problem of upward adjustments in sentence had
been eliminated, because every sentence was set at such a high maximum - life imprisonment
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Now what does this all mean for Pearce? What does Pearce necessarily imply regarding the countervailing values of finality and
prosecution? Essentially, Pearce can be explained in one of two
ways. The first approach attributes no weight at all to the defendant's appeal of his original conviction, to his retrial, or to his reconviction. It approaches the issue without reference to the defendant's
retrial and reconviction, treating the case as if the state had arbitrarily selected Pearce from other inmates in prison and, after conducting a hearing into his sentence, had increased the sentence. The
state may increase a defendant's sentence (so the argument goes) because its interest in obtaining an optimum sentence is so great, and a
defendant's interest in the finality of his sentence is so small, that the
state may reexamine sentences whenever it so desires, and, having
reexamined them, it may increase them whenever the evidence supports an increase. I 87
The trouble with the foregoing argument is that it appears to give
too much weight to the state's interest in resentencing, and too little
weight to a defendant's interest in finality. A defendant's interest in
the eventual length of his sentence may be less than his interest in an
eventual judgment on guilt or innocence, but it is a legitimate interest nonetheless, particularly if he has already fully served the sentence as originally imposed. I 88 By the same token, while the state
-that it could never be adjusted upward, see, e.g., People v. Leiva, 134 Cal. App. 2d 100, 103,
285 P.2d 46, 49 (1955). In reality, of course, it was a fiction all along to assume that such state
prisoners were truly serving life sentences. See Sturm v. California Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446,
449 (9th Cir. 1967) (Browning, J., concurring). Not only were the very great majority of state
prisoners released before the expiration of their "life" sentences, but it would have been unconstitutional to hold all of them in prison for their full lives. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,
503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). Thus, the pretense of a certain sentence of up to life
was, in reality, a fiction masking the state's desire to postpone the designation of a defendant's
actual sentence until his in-prison behavior could be studied by the California Adult Authority.
187. Justice Douglas seems to have attributed this position to the petitioner in North Carolina v. Pearce. See 395 U.S. 711, 736-37 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
188. Justice Harlan assumed in Pearce that the majority would not allow the state to increase a defendant's sentence upon retrial if the increase resulted in remanding to prison a
defendant who had already fully executed his initial sentence. See 395 U.S. at 749 n.7
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). The assumption may be based on the recognition that
a person suffers a greater loss of liberty in being remanded to prison for an additional period of
time than in continuing to be detained in prison for the same period of time. See note 176
supra.
It is sometimes said that while the state may seek an increase in sentence before a defendant commences to serve his sentence, it may not seek such an increase after commencement
of a sentence. See United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1976). If this means that the
state may never seek to increase a partially executed sentence, regardless of how promptly the
state endeavors to do so, the argument finds no support in the jurisprudence of double jeopardy. See Dunsky, The Constitutionality of Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19, 29-33 (1978). On the other hand, if it means that the state must
move promptly with respect to its reasons for seeking an increase, the argument has considerable force. After all, the only reason increases are ever allowed is because the state's interest in
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has a significant interest in adjusting a defendant's sentence to accord with his progress on rehabilitation, that does not ~xplain why
the state wished to reexamine the sentence in Pearce. It does not
explain why the state of North Carolina wished to readjust only
some sentences, or why (if it wished to reexamine only some) it selected Pearce's sentence as the candidate. 189 Consequently, if the resentencing in Pearce is to be disconnected from the happenstance of
Pearce's appeal, retrial, and reconviction, it is difficult to justify, except on the dubious assumption that a defendant's interest in the
finality of his sentence is so weak that it must yield whenever the
state randomly wishes to reexamine his sentence.
The second argument is connected to the defendant's appeal of
his original conviction, its reversal, and his retrial. It has the advantage of explaining why the state picked out Pearce from the pool of
inmates similarly situated and designated him alone for an increase
in sentence. It also explains why the State of North Carolina, in
trying to justify its decision to increase Pearce's sentence, argued that
Pearce "waived" 190 his interest in the finality of his sentence by appealing his original conviction. It explains, too, why the Supreme
Court implicitly rejected the language of ''waiver" and, yet, rationalized the increase in sentence on the ground that Pearce's successful
appeal had left "the slate wiped clean." 191
To appreciate the connection between Pearce's successful appeal
and his subsequent increase in sentence, one must understand something about the two ways in which constitutional rights may be validly relinquished. One way is by direct choice: a defendant has a
constitutional right to do X - that is, a constitutionally protected
opportunity to do X without having to suffer certain adverse consequences as a result. He also is allowed (and sometimes even entitled)192 to forego X, as long as his decision to do so is properly
obtaining an accurate sentence is thought to outweigh a defendant's interest in finality. Accordingly, if the state moves as promptly as possible in light of its reasons for seeking an
increase, it cannot be blamed for any resulting delay. This explains both the seven-year delay
following retrial in Pearce and the even longer periods of delay that occur in the; fixing of an
indeterminate sentence: each period of delay is unavoidable given the state's reasons for seeking an increase. However, the situation is different if the state is fully able to seek an increase,
and yet delays its request for long periods of time for no legitimate reason. In that event, the
unnecessary execution of even a portion of a defendant's sentence may be sufficient to preclude
the state from seeking an increase.
189. See 395 U.S. at 736-37 (Douglas, J., concurring).
190. Brief for the Petitioners at 18-19, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
191. 395 U.S. at 721.
192. It does not follow that because a person has a constitutional right to do X, he must
also have a constitutional right to waive or forego X. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965) (a defendant, who possesses a right to a jury trial but would prefer to be tried by a
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informed. If he makes an informed decision to forego his free opportunity to do X, and if the state relies to its disadvantage on his
decision, he will be deemed to have relinquished X. 193 This is the
paradigm of waiver.
The other way of relinquishing rights is by conditioned choice: a
defendant has a constitutional right to do X'; he also has a conditioned legal right to do B, the condition being that if he does B, he
foregoes X' as a matter of law. Hence, if the defendant does B, he
will be deemed to relinquish X', regardless of his state of mind regarding X' or his desire to retain X'. The latter is not an instance of
waiver - it is the paradigm offoifeiture. 194
The difference between waiver and forfeiture is easily illustrated.
Consider a defendant who, having both a constitutional right not to
take the witness stand at his own trial and a constitutional right not
to answer incriminating questions, 195 decides to testify on his own
behalf. If he makes a free and informed decision to testify, his decision will result in his relinquishing both constitutional rights - one
judge, has no right not to have a jury trial and, indeed, can be compelled to have a jury trial
over his objection). If a person (who has a right to do X) also has a right to waive or forego X,
it is either because of the peculiar interests underlying his right to X or because of independent
constitutional interests having nothing to do with his right to do X. See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the right of a defendant to represent himself, and, thus, to waive his right
to counsel, does not derive from his right to counsel, but from his independent sixth amendment interest in being able to represent himself).
193. The preclusion results not simply because a person willingly decides to forego X, but
because the state thereafter relies to its disadvantage on his decision. See Simons, Rescinding a
Waiver of a Constitutional Right, 68 GEO. L.J. 919 (1980).
194. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1957) ("Conditioning an appeal of
one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts
afarfaiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.") (emphasis
added; footnote omitted). Although Justice Black used the term "forfeiture" pejoratively in
Green to refer to a conditioned choice that was unconstitutional, the term also applies to conditioned choices that are constitutional. See text accompanying notes 201-05 iefra. For a
general discussion of forfeiture, see Westen, Forfeiture hy Guilty Plea-A Reply, 16 MICH, L,
REV. 1308 (1978); Westen, Awayfrom Waiver: A Rationalefor the Forfeiture of Consliluliona/
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
The foregoing distinction between waiver and forfeiture is more a distinction in emphasis
than in kind. In each case, a constitutional right is lost because the defendant has taken action
which has placed himself in a relationship to the state such that its interest in foreclosing a
right outweighs his interest in asserting it. Thus, in the case of forfeiture, the action consists of
his doing B; in the case of waiver, the action consists in his causing the state to rely to its
detriment on his open renunciation ofX. See Westen, Forfeiture hy Guilty Plea, supra, at 133839. In that sense, waivers are simply a subclass of a larger class of forfeitures. See Westen,
Awayfrom Waiver, supra, at 1260-61.
195. These two constitutional interests are separate and independent of one another. See
E. CLEARY, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 116 (2d ed. 1972). Thus,
a witness who is not himself on trial as a defendant has a right not to be compelled to answer
incriminating questions, but no right not to take the witness stand; conversely, a defendant on
trial for a criminal offense, who has been granted use immunity, has no constitutional right not
to answer incriminating questions outside the presence of the jury, but he does have a right not
to take the witness stand in the presence of the jury,
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by waiver, the other by forfeiture. He will waive his right not to take
the witness stand because to say that he makes a free and informed
decision to be a witness at his own trial means that he makes a free
and informed decision to forego not being a witness at his own trial.
At the same time, however, he also forfeits his separate right not to
be interrogated about the subject matter of his testimony because his
legal right to testify on his own behalf is conditioned on his subsequently answering potentially incriminating questions on cross-examination.196 As the Court says, when a defendant "elects to waive"
his right not to be a witness by electing to take the witness stand and
testify in his own behalf, he is then "not permitted to stop, but must
go on" and "subject" himself to "cross-examination." 197
Notice, again, the distinct ways in which the two foregoing rights
are relinquished. The defendant loses the right not to take the witness stand by making a free and informed decision to do the logical
converse, i.e., to take the witness stand and testify. The defendant
relinquishes his right not to answer incriminating questions in a very
different way. He relinquishes it not because he wants to be crossexamined, or because his decision to take the witness stand logically
entails being cross-examined, 198 or because he necessarily knows he
will be cross-examined, but because cross-examination is the price or
condition of his giving direct testimony. He does not choose to be
cross-examined; he is made to choose. He does not waive his right to
be free from having to answer incriminating questions; he forfeits it.
In addition to possessing different elements, waiver and forfeiture
are governed by different standards of validity. The validity of a
waiver (i.e., the validity of a decision to forego X) turns on a defendant's state of mind at the time he chooses· to forego X: the defendant's decision to forego X is valid if, at the time, the decision is
sufficiently free of adverse consequences to be deemed "voluntary'' 199 and sufficiently informed to be "knowing" and "intelli196. Once a defendant decides to testify, "[t]he interests of the other party and regard for
the function of the courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in
the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against
self-incrimination."
Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2129 (1980) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 156 (1958)).
197. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896) (emphasis added).
198. It would be perfectly conceivable to allow a defendant to take the witness stand in his
own behalf and to give testimony on direct examination, and yet immunize him from being
interrogated by the prosecution by means of cross-examination. Indeed, that was essentially
the practice until recently in Georgia. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
199. To say that an action is "voluntary" means that in addition to being an act of will (as
opposed to a reflex action), it is free of those pressures on a defendant's state of mind that are
deemed to be unacceptable as a matter oflaw. For a discussion of the kinds ofpressures,that
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gent." 200 The validity of a forfeiture (i.e.., the relinquishment of X'
as a necessary condition of doing B) turns on the connection between
the occurrence of B and the continued existence of X': the forfeiture
of X' is valid if, as a result of doing B, the defendant has placed the
state in such a position that its interests now outweigh his countervailing interests in X1 .201
The validity of forfeiture thus depends on the constitutional sufficiency of the change in the state's position. To illustrate such
changes of position in a double jeopardy context, compare United
States v. Ba!/202 with Burks v. United States. 203 The Ball Court held
that a defendant, who has already been tried and convicted once,
forfeits his right not to be retried again by successfully appealing his
original conviction. Why? Not because the defendant wants to be
tried; or because he knows he will thereafter be retried; or because he
could be retried anyway in the absence of a successful appeal; but,
rather, because his successful appeal deprives the state of the benefit
of an otherwise valid conviction for reasons that do not justify immunizing defendants from reprosecution. In other words, the successful appeal in Ball had the inevitable effect of placing the state in
the same position vis-a-vis the defendant that it occupied before
Ball's original trial and that it would have occupied had the original
trial ended in a mistrial declared over his objection for non-manipulable error - that is, a position in which its interest in prosecution
simply outweighed his interest in finality. 204
In contrast, the Burks Court held that a defendant, who has been
tried and convicted once and who otherwise cannot be tried again,
does not forfeit his right not to be retried again by successfully appealing his original conviction on grounds of insufficiency of eviare acceptable (and unacceptable) in the context of the entry of a guilty plea, see Westen &
Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies far Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471,
477-501 (1978).
200. To say that an action is "knowing" and "intelligent" means that it is based on the

kinds of information that the state is required to provide a defendant as a matter of law. For
the kinds of information that the state is required to provide in the context of guilty pleas, see
Westen & Westin, supra note 199, at 501-12.
201. If the state's interests do not outweigh the defendant's, the condition is unconstitutional and the forfeiture is invalid. If the state's interest do outweigh the defendant's, the
condition is constitutional and the forfeiture is valid. In that sense, forfeiture is the consequence of a constitutional condition. For more on constitutional and unconstitutional conditions,· see O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Al/ached, 54
CALlF. L. REV. 443, 467-70 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 13 HARV. L. REV. 1595,
1600 (1960); Note, Another Laok at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144, 151,
156-57 (1968).
202. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
203. 437 U.S. I (1978).
204. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
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dence. Why the difference between Ball and Burks? Why should
the grounds for the defendant's successful appeal in Burks have any
bearing on whether he could be retried? The answer is that the defendant's successful appeal in Burks did not place the state in the
kind of position - or restore it to the kind of position - that outweighed the defendant's interest in finality. The state's interest in
prosecution is never sufficient to outweigh a defendant's interest in
finality where reprosecution is simply an effort to improve upon a
case that failed for factual insufficiency the first time around. 205 The
successful appeal in Burks merely restored the state to the position it
would have occupied if the trial judge had done his duty and dismissed the case for insufficient evidence at trial. The defendant's
appeal in Burks did not work a forfeiture of his right not to be retried because while it produced a change in the state's position, the
change left the state in no worse a position than it would have occupied if the trial judge had himself taken the initiative (as he should
have) and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
Now back to Pearce. As between waiver and forfeiture, Pearce is
clearly a case of forfeiture. Pearce, by appealing his conviction, did
not ask to be resentenced; nor did he want to be resentenced. He
wanted the same thing as the defendant in Ball: he wanted the appellate court to reverse his conviction and, having reversed it, to announce that the state's proceedings against him were forever at an
end. Instead, like the defendant in Ball, Pearce discovered that a
successful appeal was conditioned on his automatically relinquishing
his finality interests, whether he wished to relinquish them or not.
Just as the defendant in Ball learned that a successful appeal was
conditioned on his being subject to retrial, Pearce learned that a sue205. In shon, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does
not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. . . .
When [such reversal] occurs, . . . society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the
guilty are punished . . • .
The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a
failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it
has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble. . . .
. • . Given the requirements for entry of a judgment of acquittal, the purposes of the
[Double Jeopardy] Clause would be negated were we to afford the government an opportunity for the proverbial "second bite at the apple."
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1978).
The situation in Burks - simple insufficiency - should be contrasted with cases in which
the government's evidence is insufficient after incriminating evidence, erroneously admitted at
trial, is excluded. In that event, the prosecution may not be at fault for the insufficiency of the
evidence presented the first time around. See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 26 & n.9 (1978)
(reserving the question whether Burks applies in such a situation); United States v. Mandel,
591 F.2d 1347, 1373-74 (4th Cir. 1979) (ordinarily an appellate court should remand for retrial
in such a situation).
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cessful appeal was conditioned on his being subject to retrial and resentencing.
Significantly, the Pearce Court seemed to recognize that it was
dealing with forfeiture. 206 The Court implicitly rejected the state's
invitation that it base its decision on the fiction of waiver. It refused
to pretend that Pearce actually wanted to be resentenced under a
procedure by which he might receive an increase in sentence. Nor
did it suggest that a defendant's interest in the finality of his sentence
is so :flaccid that it must always yield whenever the state wishes to
reexamine his sentence. Instead, speaking in the language of forfeiture, the Court emphasized the connection between Pearce's successful appeal and his subsequent increase in sentence, thus suggesting
that the state's sentencing procedure was a consitutional consequence or condition of his having taken a successful appeal. As the
Court said, Pearce could constitutionally be subjected to a possible
increase in sentence because - whether or not he wanted to be resentenced, and whether or not other defendants could be so resentenced - his successful appeal and reconviction effectively "wiped"
the "slate . . . clean"207 as a matter of law.
What, then, is the precise connection between Pearce's successful
appeal and his subsequent increase in sentence? How did the successful appeal produce a change in the state's position vis-a-vis the
original sentence? Why was the change in position so significant that
the State of North Carolina could resentence Pearce but could not
resentence other non-appealing defendants who (like Pearce) were
serving presumptively legal sentences? The answer is that in successfully appealing his original conviction, Pearce placed the state in the
position of having to retry him. In retrying him, the state was forced
to present a fresh record of his criminal conduct. In reconvicting
him on the fresh record, the trial judge was forced to say something
about the consequent sentence. In resentencing Pearce without reference to his original sentence, the trial judge was able to base his
206. See notes 190-91 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court has always been skeptical about speaking the language of ''waiver" to describe the conditioned choices that confront
defendants in the area of double jeopardy. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978);
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. l, 15 & n.9, 17 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
609 n. ll (1976); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44 n.l l (1975); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796-97 (1969); 395 U.S. at 811-12 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,466 (1964); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92, 197 (1957). See
also Kepner v. United States 195 U.S. 100, 136 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). When the
Court does speak of ''waiver," it uses it as a "conceptual fiction,'' North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 7ll, 749 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), to mask what it has determined to be a valid forfeiture resulting from a constitutionally conditioned choice. See Price
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1970).
207. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721.
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sentence on the fresh record as it then appeared before him. In
short, the trial judge's interest in being able to impose a fresh sentence on the basis of the probative evidence before him was the same
interest a court always has in being able to base its current judgments on the probative evidence actually before it.
The foregoing interest is substantial. Indeed, it is ultimately what
motivates most opponents of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. The advocates of the exclusionary rule make an argument that
is difficult to resist. The state cannot honestly object to the exclusion
at trial of illegally seized evidence (they say), because if the state had
behaved legally, it would never have possessed the evidence in the
first place. Thus, the exclusionary rule does no real harm, because it
merely excludes from trial evidence that would otherwise have been
absent anyway. 208 No, say their opponents. The two positions are
not equivalent because there is a fundamental difference between acquitting a defendant for lack of probative incriminating evidence
and acquitting him despite probative incriminating evidence. There
is a difference between true ignorance and pretended ignorance. Regardless of how the probative evidence comes before a court, one
cannot ask a court to enter a judgment that it knows is contrary to
the evidence before it, without imposing real costs on the system. 209
To be sure, people can reasonably differ as to whether the costs of
the exclusionary rule are outweighed by its countervailing value, but
no one can deny the reality of the cost. It is the cost of deliberately
requiring judges to enter judgments that they know to be false upon
the evidence before them. Moreover, while Mapp v. Ohio 210 may
stand for the proposition that the cost of requiring the entry of false
judgments is outweighed by fourth amendment values, Pearce implies that the cost is not outweighed by a defendant's double jeopardy interest in the finality of his original sentence. This is
significant, because it means that even if a defendant's :finality interest suffices to prevent a court from initiating an inquiry into an otherwise legal sentence, it does not suffice to prevent a court that must
impose a fresh sentence anyway from basing the fresh sentence on
probative evidence actually before it.
Ultimately, Pearce also means something for .DiFrancesco because, whichever of the two rationales is adopted, Pearce becomes
208. See Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make
the Fourth Amendment More Than 'An Empty Blessing,' 62 JUDICATURE 337, 344 (1979).
209. See J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 215-16
(2d ed. 1978).
210. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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authority for the position that the government may appeal an erroneous sentence without violating double jeopardy. If Pearce stands
for the proposition that a defendant's interest in the finality of his
sentence is so tenuous that the government may reopen even a valid
sentence and increase it whenever it so chooses, then it follows that
the government may promptly move to reopen a sentence which it
can show to be clearly erroneous and replace it with whatever increase in sentence is necessary to correct the error. Similarly, if
·Pearce means that a trial judge may increase a presumptively valid
sentence whenever a defendant's appeal and retrial produces a fresh
record that now justifies a higher sentence, then it follows a fortiori
that an appellate court may increase a defendant's sentence on appeal whenever evidence already in the appellate record shows that
the trial judge's sentence is invalid. In either case, having recognized
what Pearce implicity says about the relatively light weight of a defendant's interest in the finality of his sentence, one discovers that
.DiFrancesco is truly an easy case.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has a favorite saying about double jeopardy.
The Court found the saying in a law review article, adopted it as its
own in Pearce, and has repeated it ever since. The saying is short
and punchy, and partly true. It goes like this:
[T]he Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy . . . has
been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. [1] It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [2] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction. [3] And it protects against multiple punishment for
the same offense. 211

The foregoing synopsis of double jeopardy is half true, half false.
Ironically, like all half-truths, it is ultimately more hazardous than:
an untruth, because the true half tends to mask the false half and,
disguising it, allows the falsity to work its mischief unnoticed. The
truth of it is, the double jeopardy clause is comprised of three distinct principles; and the three principles are connected to the rules
governing retrial following acquittal, retrial following conviction,
and multiple punishment. These points are true and significant, and
211. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). The Court
was relying on an analysis in Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 15 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965). The
Court has relied on this three-part analysis ever since. See Illinois v. Vitale, 100 S. Ct. 2260,
2264 (1980); Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1442 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
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the Pearce Court advanced the jurisprudence of double jeopardy by
recognizing them.
The flaw is that by failing to identify the governing values that
underlie the three rules, the Court has no way of knowing what the
rules really mean. Consider the prohibition of multiple punishment.
Every member of the Court appears to agree that the double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishment. But because they have
never collectively focused on the values that inform the prohibition,
they have no common idea as to what the prohibition itself means;
and not knowing what they mean by it, they disagree on its application.212 So it is, too, for individual justices. Thus, after announcing
three years ago that double punishment meant one thing, Justice
Blackm.un now admits that it means something quite different. 213 He
has changed his position, not because he believes double punishment
should no longer be prohibited, but because he now understands
what double punishment has really meant'all along.
The same is also true of the second of the three rules, the prohibition on retrial following a conviction. By juxtaposing the second
rule with the first rule (i.e., the rule prohibiting retrial following an
acquittal), the Court implied that the two prohibitions are of equal
strength. Yet, in reality, the prohibition on retrial following an acquittal is far stronger because the value giving it meaning is more
absolute. The prohibition on retrial following an acquittal is based
on a jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence, and the prohibition is nearly "absolute."214 The prohibition on retrial following a
conviction is based upon a weaker interest in finality, and is a product of "balancing."215 The reality is that a defendant usually can be
retried following a conviction (and following most dismissals and
mistrials), because a state's interest in reprosecution usually suffices
to outweigh the relatively weak interest of defendants in finality.
In many ways, however, the most serious problem is the first of
the three rules - the prohibition on retrial following an acquittal.
The Court experiences more "confusion,"216 overrules more prior
212. Compare Whalen v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436-37 (1980) (treating the
double jeopardy clause as a presumption against punishing a defendant in excess of what the
legislature may have intended), with 100 S. Ct. at 1442-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (treating
the double jeopardy clause as adding nothing to ordinary rules of statutory construction).
213. 100 S. Ct. at 1440-41 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing a view of multiple punishment distinct from the view he expressed in Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155
(1977) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)).
214. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).
215. See note 112 supra.
216. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 15 (1978). See also Sanabria v. United States, 437
U.S. 54, 80 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to "the Court's continuing struggle to
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decisions, 217 and faces more unresolved issues218 in the field of acquittals than any other area of double jeopardy. The Court's problem, once again, is that it proclaims a rule without articulating the
rule's rationale and, not identifying the rationale, has no clear idea
as to what the rule really means. 219 The Court proclaims the absolute .finality of "acquittals" (as opposed to the lesser .finality of
"convictions"); but because the Court has failed to identify the values that justify such .finality, it has no way of knowing what kinds of
judicial rulings qualify as "acquittals" within the meaning of its
rule.220
Once the Court understands why acquittals are accorded such a
high degree of .finality, it will know what distinguishes acquittals
from other favorable rulings. The one value that seems to justify
such .finality for acquittals is the value in allowing a jury to acquit
against the evidence. If that is so, the implications are revealing. It
means that the only judicial rulings that qualify as acquittals for
double jeopardy purposes are jury verdicts of not guilty.221 It means
that the other rulings that are sometimes associated with acquittals
create order and understanding out of the confusion of the lengthening list of its decisions
[regarding acquittals] on the Double Jeopardy Clause").
217. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling United States v. Jenkins,
420 U.S. 358 (1975)); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I (1978) (overruling Bryan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950)); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 348-51 (1975) (overruling
what many had taken to be the double jeopardy definition of "acquittal" in United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970)).
218. See, e.g., Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 25 n.7, 26 nn. 9-10 (1978) (reserving three
separate questions for future consideration). See also Cooper, supra note 99, at 539 ("the
Court has not yet succeeded in articulating constitutional concepts that are clear enough to
resolve many of the important questions").
219. "The word ['acquittal'] itself has no talismanic quality for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause." Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975). See also Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 144 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("[t)he word 'acquittal' ... is no
magic open sesame").
220. Significantly, the Court appears to recognize that its experience with government appeals has been too limited and of too recent a vintage to enable it to mark out a definitive
position. Thus, the Court candidly admits that its initial efforts to define "acquittals" have
been unsuccessful and that as its experience grows, it considers itself free to correct its mistakes. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84-87 (1978). This process of backing and
filling can be expected to continue. As Professor Edward Cooper has said, "It is difficult to
believe that the Court has yet charted the course it will ultimately follow." Cooper, supra note
99, at 540.
221. The Court has held that a judge-made ruling in a defendant's favor in the course of a
jury trial is an "acquittal" for double jeopardy purposes if it is "a resolution, correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). Accord, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978);
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 n,8
(1977). There are two major problems with the foregoing formulation. First, there is no principled reason why a defendant should enjoy a greater degree of finality following a legally
erroneous ruling in his favor than he enjoys following the reversal of an erroneous ruling
against him. See Cooper, supra note 99, at 555 (referring to ''the increasingly cogent argument
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are not acquittals at all, including judge-made findings of not guilty
in trials to the bench, judge-ordered dismissals in a defendant's
favor, whether made before, during or after trial, judge-entered
judgments of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence, appellate reversals for insufficiency of evidence, and determinations of sentence,
whether by judge or jury. It means, finally, that since they are not
acquittals for double jeopardy purposes, the finality of these latter
rulings is governed by some other double jeopardy standard. Not
being governed by the prohibition on retrial following an acquittal,
they must be governed by the only standard that remains - the standard of finality that governs retrials following mistrials and reversed
convictions.222
In conclusion, the Court applies two distinct standards of finality
in double jeopardy cases: a strong standard for "acquittals," a
weaker standard for convictions. Once one understands the distinction between the two cases, one realizes that nothing qualifies as an
acquittal except a jury verdict of not guilty, and that all other rulings
are governed by the same standards of finality as govern convictions.
That does not mean that judge-made rulings in a defendant's favor
are never final. It means that they are no more final than mistrials,
dismissals, reversed convictions, and :findings of insufficiency of evidence, because for purposes of finality, they are all indistinguishable.

that the double jeopardy clause should not be read to bar government appeals that rest only on
matters of law"). See also text accompanying notes 17-35, 37-40 supra, and note 148 supra.
Second, the foregoing definition of acquittals is inconsistent with the Court's other decisions. If an· erroneous ruling by a judge comes after a jury verdict of guilty, it should be
appealable for reasons set forth in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975): reversal on
appeal will result in the reinstatement of an existing and valid verdict of guilty. If the ruling
comes before the case is submitted to the jury and in response to a motion by the defendant, it
should be appealable for the reasons set forth in Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977): the
initial proceeding terminated at the defendant's request without any showing of bad faith by
the prosecution.
222. See generally Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 148-55. This explains why the defendant could not be retried following the trial judge's favorable (but "egregiously erroneous")
ruling in Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam). Although the Court
treated the trial judge's ruling in Fong Foo as an" 'acquittal [that] was final, and could not be
reviewed . . . without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the
Constitution,'" 396 U.S. at 143, quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896), it
should be clear by now that it was not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, because it
was not a jury verdict of not guilty. Yet that does not mean that the judge's ruling was not
final for double jeopardy purposes. It was final for the same reason as the trial judge's erroneous declaration of a mistrial in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (plurality opinion): because without first obtaining the defendant's consent, the trial judge denied the
defendant an opportunity "to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there
with an acquittal," and he did so for the kind of arbitrary reasons that do not justify subjecting
a defendant to retrial. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 58, at 149-50.

